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 The international landscape shifts with time. Subsequently, the planning required to meet 
the needs of contemporary defense and foreign policy objectives changes in stride with the 
international landscape. As the United States has attempted to keep up with the constantly evolving 
security needs of the contemporary world, the use and understanding of deterrence has grown 
beyond the definition: “use-of-threat”. Specifically, deterrence and dissuasion have overlapped in 
practice and consideration. The overlapping and inappropriate grouping of deterrence and 
dissuasion in the modern practice of policy creation is problematic, because refraining from 
properly considering dissuasion as its own tactic jeopardizes American security. 
 In order to clearly define the line between dissuasion and deterrence, this research utilizes a 
case study and theory testing methodology. The results of the undertaken methodology have found 
that dissuasion is a tactic in itself, and possesses its own unique parameters. Dissuasion, based on 
the case study and theory testing methodology which establish its parameters, is recommended to 
be appropriately incorporated into policy creation through the institution of Congress. Ultimately, 
the appropriate incorporation of dissuasion into policy creation will enhance American security by 
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 United States CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie, in a March 2020 hearing of 
the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services testified that: “the United States has 
leveraged Iran, through deterrence, into a position where their only real option to retaliate is by 
attacking.”1 Iranian aggression in modern day comes on the heels of unprecedented deterrence 
efforts such as economic sanctions implemented by the United States, allocation of American 
troops to Saudi Arabia, and the assassination of an Iranian General in a targeted drone strike. 
Subsequently, the inability to confidently predict if Iran will not attack U.S. assets indicates that 
deterrence methodologies have not achieved the primary objective of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) in the National Defense Strategy (NDS).  
 The objective of the NDS is simple. The NDS explains that the enduring mission of the 
Department of Defense is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and 
protect the security of the United States.2 Though the United States has implemented deterrence, 
there is still a possibility that Iran will jeopardize security of the United States by attacking. The 
realization of a failed deterrence strategy with Iran, due to the continued possibility of Iranian 
attacks, highlights that there is a “hole” in American policy planning. The author of this thesis 
served as a staffer on the Senate Committee on Armed Services from 2018 - 2021, and 
experienced committee deliberations regarding why and where deterrence has failed in policy 
planning. Based on committee deliberations, the author of this research determined if American 
 
1 United States Commitee on Armed Services.” Hearing | Hearings | United States Commitee on Armed 
Services, March 12, 2020. 
2 National Defense Strategy of the United States, 2018  




security is being jeopardized due to failed American deterrence efforts, the time has come to 
adequately consider dissuasion as a tactic which can be used by or against the United States. 
 The NDS, in 2018, replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as the capstone of 
strategic guidance to the United States Department of Defense (DoD). The transition from the 
QDR to the NDS yielded a “hole” in American policy planning which has yet to be filled. 
Specifically, the pivot from the QDR to the NDS undercut the consideration of dissuasion as one 
of four key strategic goals abroad; along with deterring threats as another key strategic goal.3 
Subsequently, US policymakers have been left yearning for clarification on how to approach 
contemporary and future circumstances within the international arena. One example of where US 
policymakers are contemporarily yearning for clarification on how to approach a dilemma is 
with the scenario outlined by CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie regarding Iran. 
“Some analysts want to downplay dissuasion or set it aside entirely because of its 
ambiguity. But ignoring this emerging idea would be short sighted.”4 Therefore, this research 
directly addresses dissuasion, and furthers the dialogue around the ambiguous concept. Despite 
its haziness, the term goes to the heart of new-era geopolitics in several key regions, including 
the Middle East and Asia, which are discussed in the following chapters. If the United States can 
understand dissuasion adequately, its strategic effectiveness in troubled regions will improve 
significantly.5  
Richard Kuglar, a scholar with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National 
Defense University, explained the significance of this research in 2001. When the idea of 
 
3 Kugler, Richard L., and National Defense University Washington DC Inst for National Strategic Studies. 
“Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept”. DTIC 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 




deterrence first appeared over 50 years ago, it too was ambiguous. During the Cold War, 
however, it acquired a role of central importance once it was equipped with a full-fledged 
strategic theory.6 This research, in accordance with Kuglar, believes the same may hold true for 
dissuasion contemporarily - but only if it too is equipped with the full set of analyses and 
calculations needed to bring it to life.7 
 Through three comprehensive chapters, this research addresses the “hole” which is 
present in policy planning due to the undercutting of dissuasion as a key strategic goal following 
the transition from the QDR to the NDS. Chapter one undertakes a blended methodology 
approach of theory testing and theory proposing. Chapter two utilizes a methodology of classic 
case study. And, lastly, chapter three brings the first two chapters to a crescendo with a 
predictive methodology. Through the findings of each chapter, this research will contribute to 
equipping dissuasion with analysis and calculation needed to bring it to life. 
 Chapter one fleshes out the history of dissuasion within national security documents, and 
outlines how the “hole” in contemporary policymaking was formulated when the QDR was 
replaced with the NDS. Additionally, chapter one contrasts dissuasion with deterrence, and 
defines the imperative distinction which is apparent when the two are compared side-by-side. 
Moreover, the first chapter also goes on to explain how dissuasion fits into future policy planning 
of the United States, and where deterrence does not necessarily meet the needs of the upcoming 
national security landscape. Chapter one links dissuasion to the three-theatre construct which is 
likely to be used in future policy planning to keep pace in the new great power competition. The 
three-theatre construct outlined in the chapter will addresses Iran, China, and Russia as the 
 
6 Ibid 
7 Kugler, Richard L., and National Defense University Washington DC Inst for National Strategic Studies. 
“Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept”. DTIC 




critical adversaries which the U.S. ought to be prepared to compete with by having an adequate 
understanding of dissuasion. 
 When considering the three-theatre construct which the United States will likely adopt in 
preparation to succeed in the new great power competition, chapter one goes on to discuss the 
types of conflict the U.S. ought to anticipate. The types of conflicts which this research 
highlights are closely linked to dissuasion and the way in which a deeper understanding of the 
tactic ties into policy planning. For example, under the anticipated three-theatre construct, there 
must be a forecast to plan and understand the utilization of strategy and actions to influence the 
nature of future military competition. “Dissuasion is a subtler concept than deterrence, and 
pursuing it is less straight forward”8. When assessing simultaneous long duration operations and 
grey zone conflicts, this research offers a way to utilize dissuasion through influencing the 
strategic psychology and political aspirations of potential adversaries9. Influence over the nature 
of future military conflict and planning which correlates with such scenarios is fleshed out in 
depth in chapter one. Fleshing out these respective scenarios in this manner is a component of 
equipping dissuasion with the analysis and calculation needed to bring it to life. 
 In order to highlight the contemporary relevance of dissuasion in American policy 
planning, chapter one also delves into the ways and manners in which Iran has wielded 
dissuasion against the United States. In order to establish with the reader that the contemporary 
use of dissuasion by Iran against the United States is not a mere anomaly, the chapter also goes 
on to discuss where Taiwan and North Korea have wielded dissuasion. The objective of chapter 
one is simple: illuminate where the tactic of dissuasion is present in current policy planning 
 
8 Kugler, Richard L., and National Defense University Washington DC Inst for National Strategic Studies. 
“Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept”. DTIC 
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scenarios. As a result, the illumination of where dissuasion is present in current policy planning 
scenarios solidifies the fact that dissuasion is indeed its own concept, and fits the parameters laid 
out in this research. 
 As stated earlier in this introduction, in order to pragmatically construct American policy, 
policymakers must possess an adequate understanding of dissuasion and the ways in which it has 
been intertwined with American policy historically. Chapter two, therefore, discusses where the 
United States itself has used dissuasion as a tactic. The historical examples of American-used 
dissuasion in chapter two also point out instances where dissuasion has been categorized or 
classified inappropriately. 
 To effectively flesh out where and how the United States has utilized dissuasion 
historically, chapter two leans on a classic method of case study. The classic case study method 
leans on qualitative information which is explorative, descriptive, interpretive, and explanatory. 
And, it is important to note that this method refrains from blending statistical and formal 
approaches. The classic case study methodology used in chapter two creates a compelling 
foundation to further the differentiation between dissuasion and deterrence, and also sheds a 
spotlight on where dissuasion has indeed been used by the United States. Particularly, where 
dissuasion has been used by the United States, but not categorized as such. 
 It is critical for policy makers and scholars to recognize where dissuasion has been 
leveraged by the United States itself. The second chapter of this thesis touches on three specific 
instances of American-used dissuasion. The first instance of American dissuasion is the Iran 
nuclear deal which was created under the Obama Administration to dissuade Iran. The second 
example of American dissuasion is the Taiwan Relations Act which is used to dissuade China. 
The third instance of American-utilized dissuasion is the bolstering of Israel’s nuclear ambiguity 




to dissuade other nation states from attacking Israel. Each of the historical exemplars of 
American dissuasion which are highlighted in the second chapter of this research are unique in 
their own way. However, each of the historical exemplars of chapter two fit within the 
parameters of dissuasion outlined in chapter one of this thesis. Subsequently, chapter two further 
equips dissuasion with vital analysis and calculation needed to bring it to life. 
 Among the key findings in chapter two is that dissuasion is diplomatic in nature, and 
guides another nation state into acting out of its own volition. Moreover, chapter two goes on to 
explain how deterrence, on the contrary, uses fear to push another nation state away from a 
course of action under threat of economic or militaristic terror. These key findings are derived 
from the definitions of deterrence and dissuasion which are also unpacked in the second chapter. 
And, in accordance with the respective definitions of dissuasion and deterrence, chapter two 
doubles down to reinforce that the United States has used dissuasion as an individual tactic 
through examining historical examples. Inversely, the historical exemplars of American-
implemented dissuasion from chapter two do not satisfy the definition of deterrence. Therefore, 
chapter two further reinforces the differentiation between dissuasion and deterrence, and equips 
dissuasion with analysis needed to bring it to life. 
 While the second chapter of this thesis does indeed touch on three different instances of 
American-utilized dissuasion, one notably significant exemplar is the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) 
which was established under the Obama Administration. The Iran nuclear deal did not convince 
Iran that the cost of pursuing a nuclear bomb was too great. On the contrary, the Iran Nuclear 
Deal utilized strategy to influence the nature of future military competition. Chapter three takes 
the dissuasive exemplar of the JCPOA, and uses it as a springboard to predict future use of 
dissuasion by the United States. 




 Chapter three explains that the United States pursued and enacted a deal with Iran that, 
according to the Obama Administration, mitigated the likelihood of military competition oriented 
around a landscape that was comprised of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon.10 The United States, 
through the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, wielded dissuasion. Chapter three also 
explains how the dissuasive JCPOA deal leveraged under the Obama Administration was 
strikingly different than the approach adopted by the Trump Administration. Specifically, the 
chapter unpacks how the approach of interacting with Iran which was adopted by the Trump 
Administration was deterrence-oriented. The JCPOA, under the Obama Administration, was a 
tactic of dissuasion. And, the JCPOA was crafted and implemented under an administration that 
consisted of Joe Biden as Vice President. Chapter three delves into the significance of a Biden 
Administration for the future use of dissuasion. 
 Chapter three focuses on the new presidential administration with Joe Biden at the helm, 
and outlines a prediction of a new nuclear deal between the United States and Iran. The chapter 
expresses that there is an anticipation by this research to see the 2015 JCPOA used as a baseline 
for a new future deal between the United States and Iran. Of course, since the 2015 JCPOA is 
expected to be used as a baseline, a new nuclear deal which is created under the Biden 
Administration is expected to be a tactic of dissuasion. Chapter three breaks down the 
components of what a new nuclear deal is likely to look like, and highlights how the likelihood 
of a new nuclear deal points to dissuasion being used in American policy in the future. 
 The third chapter of this research also explains that though there is reason to believe 
President Joe Biden will pursue another dissuasive deal with Iran, this research expects that 
President Biden will work to create a deal which parallels that of the 2015 JCPOA, while also 
 
10 Staff, Washington Post. Full Text: Obama's News Conference on the Iran Nuclear Deal. The 
Washington Post. WP Company, May 1, 2019 




addressing deficiencies and downfalls of the 2015 JCPOA. The chapter articulates predictive 
expectations of the Biden Administration to address primary deficiencies of the JCPOA. For 
example, the third chapter will focus on remedies to concerns for congressional support, security 
of Israel, and support for terrorist organizations should a new deal be pursued. Moreover, chapter 
three goes into great detail to explain what a new nuclear deal shouldn’t look like, what a new 
deal should look like, why the political landscape is conducive for a new deal, and, of course, 
how a new nuclear deal will indeed also be a tactic of dissuasion. 
 The third chapter of this thesis illuminates why it is pragmatic to anticipate any new 
nuclear deal which the Biden Administration attempts to create with Iran will be dissuasive in 
nature. The chapter also underscores that should a new nuclear deal as outlined by this research 
be pursued, the framework laid out by this thesis will be a tool at the disposal of policymakers. 
The understanding of dissuasion as a tactic and concept in its own right, based on the key points 
from chapter three, will allow for policymakers to begin planning for the future, and closing the 
“hole” in American policy planning which was created when the National Defense Strategy 
replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review. Chapter three finds that dissuasion can be 
incorporated in American policy planning immediately, and enhance American security by 
addressing a contemporary policy obstacle. Chapter three proves the relevance of dissuasion in 
modern day, and equips dissuasion with another analysis needed to bring it to life. 
 All in all, the chapters which follow this introduction will address the implications of 
considering dissuasion as its own tactic and concept in terms of policy creation. Dissuasion is a 
concept which has been severely neglected as the international landscape shifts with time. Now, 
should policymakers understand and view dissuasion as a tactic and concept in itself, there can 
be an expectation for the threshold which ought to be met by new initiatives that are undertaken 




with the objectives of dissuasion in mind. A new nuclear deal with Iran which parallels the 
JCPOA, bearing in mind the instances of American dissuasion from chapter two, and the 
differentiation between dissuasion and deterrence in chapter one, spotlight that understanding 
dissuasion is indeed a contemporary dilemma. 
 The research following this introduction will addresses the question of: “so what?”. It is 
imperative for scholars and policy practitioners to make the distinction between deterrence and 
dissuasion, because an understanding of greater depth between the two concepts will yield 
stronger American policy, and enhance American security. This research facilitates 
accomplishing the goal of creating a baseline understanding of how dissuasion is critical to 
















Dissuasion and Documents of National Security 
 
In 2018, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) replaced the Quadrennial Defense 
Review  (QDR) as the capstone of strategic guidance to the United States Department of 
Defense (DoD). The transition from the QDR to the NDS yielded a “hole” in American 
defense policy planning which has yet to be filled. Specifically, the pivot from the QDR to the 
NDS has undercut the consideration of dissuasion as a tactic within international defense 
policy, and left US policymakers yearning for clarification regarding how to approach 
contemporary circumstances within the international arena. Dissuasion is a concept which has 
been severely neglected as the international landscape shifts with age. This paper highlights 
what exactly dissuasion is in the contemporary sense, and how the concept should be 
considered as the United States enters the era of the new great power competition. 
For context, it is important to understand the previously intended byproduct of 
implementing the tactic of dissuasion in relation to the United States. According to the 2001 
QDR, “dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US 
interests or those of US allies”11 was one of the four key goals to guiding development of US 
forces, capabilities, deployment, and use. So, what exactly was dissuasion according to the 2001 
QDR, and how was it expected to accomplish one of the former key goals of the United States? 
The 2001 QDR explains that dissuasion is “utilizing strategy and actions, to influence 
the  nature of future military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and 
complicates military planning for adversaries. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore 
dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.”12 This paper argues that 
 
11 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001. 
12 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001. 




dissuasion, based off of the definition provided in the 2001 QDR, is a tactic which can be 
utilized by any nation state against any other nation state. Notably, dissuasion can be used by 
a nation state which possesses inferior hard power capabilities against another nation state 
which possesses superior hard power capabilities. The notion that dissuasion can be used by 
any nation state against any other nation state (regardless of power dynamic) is critical to the 
argument of this research. Particularly, the concept of dissuasion being accessible to all 
nations distinctly separates    dissuasion from deterrence. 
 
Dissuasion vs. Deterrence 
What exactly makes the tactic of dissuasion different from the tactic of deterrence? 
According to the Brookings Institution, “the deterrence concept is straight-forward: persuade a 
potential adversary that the risks and costs of their proposed actions far outweigh any gains 
that they might hope to achieve.”13 With that said, deterrence is often coupled with hard power 
capabilities.   For example, in relation to the Cold War, “to make deterrence credible, the United 
States built up  powerful strategic, theater and tactical nuclear forces that could threaten any 
potential aggressor with the catastrophic risks and costs of a nuclear retaliatory strike against 
their homeland.”14 
Claudia Major and Christian Mölling double down on the definition offered by The 
Brookings Institution. Major and Mölling explain that there is somewhat of a default 
deterrence theory which political scientists, policymakers, and military officials reference 
when discussing foreign policy and the international security environment. Mainly, the default 
 
13 Bush, Richard C., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Steven Pifer, and 
Kenneth M Pollack. “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges.” Brookings. 
Brookings, July 28, 2016. 
14 Ibid 




understanding of deterrence theory echoes back to the Cold War and simple militaristic 
superiority. The traditional default Cold War interpretation of deterrence is not adequate for 
modern day. Major and Mölling  claim that a “much broader conceptual work on deterrence is 
needed. How can deterrence work in a world in which security is much more than a military 
matter?.”15 
Though Major and Mölling reinforce the definition of deterrence offered by the 
Brookings Institution, the two scholars also claim that “in fact, deterrence can work in a world 
in   which security is more than a military matter. However, this is only true if the 
psychological-cognitive dimension of deterrence is understood, and effectively utilized.”16 
This paper, on the contrary, argues that the effective utilization of the psychological-cognitive 
dimension of deterrence is not truly deterrence. Rather, the respective psychologically-driven 
tactic which Major and Mölling are referring to is dissuasion. This paper also believes that the 
psychologically-driven tactic which Major and Mölling present, aligns with the definition of 
dissuasion outlined in the 2001 QDR. 
So, why is dissuasion different than deterrence with respect to hard power capacities? 
“The trick remains as ever to convince one’s adversary that it is futile to try to use force in the 
pursuit of their interests, even if it is no longer (mainly) about tanks and nukes.”17 The ultimate 
objective between deterrence and dissuasion may be similar, but the tactics to implementing 
either of the two is the difference. The difference in tactical implementation between deterrence 
and dissuasion is part of what is considered a gap of knowledge for conflict theory. The gap of 
knowledge between tactical implementation of deterrence and dissuasion comprises part of the 
 
15 Major, Claudia, and Christian Mölling. “Rethinking Deterrence: Adapting an Old Concept to New 
Challenges” Report. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2016. 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid 




“hole” in American defense policy planning which policymakers are grappling with. 
As previously stated, dissuasion is “utilizing strategy and actions, to influence the nature 
of future military competitions, channeling threats in certain directions, and complicating 
military planning for adversaries. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other 
countries from initiating future military competitions.”18 Deterrence, on the other hand, is 
“persuading a potential adversary that the risks and costs of their proposed actions far outweigh 
any gains that they might hope to achieve”19, and is often reinforced with the threat of hard 
power  consequences. Subsequently, based off of the definition of dissuasion derived from the 
2001 QDR and the definition of deterrence from The Brookings Institution, dissuasion can be 
utilized by inferior hard power capable states against another nation state which possesses 
superior hard power capabilities. 
It is important to recognize that dissuasion is not limited to being used solely by nation 
states which possess inferior hard power capabilities when going toe-to-toe with a nation state 
possessing superior hard power capabilities. Dissuasion, since the tactic is merely utilizing 
strategy and actions to channel threats in certain directions, can also be used by more-capable 
nations against less-capable countries. However, the same cannot be said for deterrence. 
Deterrence is a tactic which can only be leveraged by a militarily and economically superior 
country against a militarily and economically inferior country. So, while dissuasion is the only 
defense tactic available for a militarily and economically inferior country, dissuasion and 
deterrence are not mutually exclusive for a nation with superior hard power capabilities. 
 
 
18 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001. 
19 Bush, Richard C., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Steven Pifer, and 
Kenneth M Pollack. “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges.” Brookings. 
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Assessment of the Undercutting of Dissuasion 
 
The question must be posed: where has dissuasion been undercut as was claimed in 
the beginning of this paper? In order to find evidence of the proposition that the tactic of 
dissuasion  has been undercut in defense planning, there can be citation of the National 
Defense Strategy. The NDS of the United States highlights that one of the primary defense 
objectives of the US Department of Defense (DoD) is “dissuading, preventing, or deterring 
state adversaries and non- state actors.”20 Throughout the entire NDS document summary, 
dissuasion is only mentioned once. Specifically, dissuasion is mentioned in the exact quote 
from the NDS which is presented in this paragraph. Moreover, dissuasion is coupled with 
deterrence in the NDS summary, and is not considered with respect to the way it can be 
wielded by adversarial nation states which possess inferior hard power capabilities. 
“In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld introduced the concept of dissuasion, citing it as one of the ‘four key goals that will 
guide the development of US forces and capabilities, their deployment and use’”21. In the 
current NDS, dissuasion is mentioned almost in a passing sense through one of    the primary 
defense objectives. The lack of consideration for the use of dissuasion by adversarial  nation 
states which possess inferior hard power capabilities comprises the “hole” in American 
defense policy planning which leaves US policymakers yearning for clarification on how to 
approach contemporary circumstances within the international arena. Not to mention, pivoting  
away from considering dissuasion with respect to American defense policy is diminishing 
 
20 National Defense Strategy of the United States, 2018 
21 Krepinevich, Andrew F, and Robert Martinage. “Dissuasion Strategy.” CSBA. Accessed May 8, 2021. 
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American defense prospects for success in the newly emerging great power competition. 
The NDS explains that the enduring mission of the Department of Defense is to 
provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the 
United States.    Should deterrence fail, the Joint force is prepared to reinforce America’s 
traditional tools of diplomacy, through military options which ensure the President and U.S. 
diplomats negotiate from a position of strength22. Be that as it may, the contemporary 
landscape of preserving national security yields an uncertainty regarding the successful 
implementation of “deterrence strategy” against adversarial nations which possess a distinctly 
less-significant hard power capability in comparison to the United States. The uncertainty 
(“hole” in American defense policy) is a byproduct of the evolution of international relations 
and hard power capabilities across the globe. Accounting for dissuasion from adversarial 
states is not given adequate consideration. Dissuasion is a concept which possesses a 
framework of its own, and should garner a higher level of scrutiny which was lost from the 
transition of the QDR to the NDS. 
 
Dissuasion and the Future of American National Security 
How does dissuasion fit into future defense policy initiatives of the United States, and 
where does deterrence not meet the needs of the upcoming defense landscape? According to Dr. 
Robert Haffa of Johns Hopkins University, it is likely the United States will pursue a three- 
theatre construct when planning for future conflicts. In fact, the Trump Administration indicated 
it was likely already implementing a three-theatre construct to keep pace with the new great 
power competition. The three-theatre strategy will likely focus on Russia, China, and Iran 
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as the critical adversarial nation states which the U.S. military is sized and shaped to meet. 
Though the greatest focus moving forward ought to primarily be allocated toward Russia and 
China as the adversaries which pose the most prominent threats, a unique situation arises when 
assessing Iran. 
Previously, the United States has undertaken a strategy which anticipates one or two 
major conflicts which the US military will be involved with. However, with the changing of 
the landscape within the great power competition, there is not likely to be one or two major 
wars which the United States should be prepared to endure. Rather, there ought to be 
consideration of  simultaneous long duration operations. The moving parts which facilitate 
simultaneous long duration operations play to the advantage of Iran and its implementation of 
dissuasion. The simultaneous long duration operations which the United States must be 
prepared to endure allow    the Iranian regime to utilize strategy and actions to influence the 
nature of future military competition with the United States. Iran has been able to leverage the 
landscape of the new great   power competition to channel threats in certain directions, and 
complicate American military planning. Through channeling threats in certain direction and 
complicating military planning, Iran has utilized the tactic of dissuasion. 
In the following section of this paper, the ways and manners in which Iran has 
wielded dissuasion will be highlighted to exemplify a contemporary instance of where the 
United States  is inadequately addressing the policy planning surrounding the tactic of 
dissuasion. Subsequently, there will be additional sections of this paper which highlight 
examples of where Taiwan and North Korea have also wielded dissuasion. Ultimately, it is 
the objective of this chapter to illuminate where the tactic of dissuasion is present in current 
policy planning scenarios. 
Considering that deterrence has not been successful on behalf of the United States 




against  Iran, it can be inferred that Iran has successfully implemented and utilized dissuasion. 
The Iranian regime has taken actions within the years of 2019 and 2020, which under rational 
thought, could garner a much more serious militaristic response from the United States than 
what     has already been utilized. With that said, the United States has remained extremely 
calculated and measured in the use of military-oriented hard power. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has dissuaded the United States from acting more 
aggressively. And, in a way, the Iranian regime is winning the contentious relationship with 
the  United States. At worst, Iran has leveraged the US into a corner where any further 
escalation is    not likely or extremely incremental. The result is that Iran has determined the 
American threshold of utilizing hard power capabilities and used that determination to 
successfully wield the tactic of dissuasion. 
Despite the claims by General McKenzie, Iran has proven that they are not fearful of 
attacking the United States. Cognizant of its technological and military inferiority vis-à-vis 
adversaries such as the United States, Israel, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, 
Iran chooses to employ this range of tools to subvert and provoke its adversaries and test the 
threshold for tolerance of its activities, while ensuring that it operates short of large-scale 
warfare.23 Specifically, decades of economic sanctions have forced Iran to exercise 
resourcefulness and creativity, using methods that are unconventional to counter conventionally 
superior adversaries.24 It can be anticipated that as long as Iran lacks the conventional military 
power to match the United States or Israel, the paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
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(IRGC) will look to sustain and build proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi‘ite militias in 
Syria, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen to pressure the United States, its allies, and regional 
partners to balance the deterrence equation.25 
Moreover, Iran overtly launched a missile attack on a US base as recently as January of 
2020. According to The Brookings Institution, Iranian leadership proclaimed the attack as a “slap 
in the face” to the United States.26 There is also concern of Iran launching more overt attacks 
against the US. According to Daniel Byman, the most obvious probability of more attacks will 
be on another U.S. base or other official facility in Iraq due to the extensive networks and 
proxies highlighted in the previous paragraph.27 The concern of recent and potentially new 
attacks clashes with the outline of successful deterrence proposed by Mölling, General 
McKenzie, and the Brookings Institution. 
The actions of Iran are not consistent with Mölling’s explanation of deterrence, 
General  McKenzie’s explanation of achieving deterrence, or the definition of deterrence 
presented by The Brookings Institution. Iran has managed to continuously attack American 
allies and Americans without an overwhelming American military retaliation which could 
easily win a militaristic engagement between the two nations. Additionally, as is stated 
previously, the same components of the new landscape of      the great power competition which 
allow Iran to use dissuasion are also present with Taiwan and    North Korea. 
 
 
Dissuasion and Iran 
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In accordance with the argument of this research, the methodologies leveraged by Iran 
fall starkly in line with the definition of dissuasion outlined by the 2001 QDR. In elaboration, 
the       increasingly tense relationship between the United States and Iran has unearthed the issue 
that deterrence strategy against Iran, though claimed successful by military leadership, has not 
entirely deterred undesired aggressive actions by the Iranian regime. Particularly, it is difficult 
to  predict and confidently answer if Iran will attack United States troops or allies in the region 
despite serious deterrence efforts by the US. 
For example, in a March hearing of the United States Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, United States CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie testified that: “the United 
States has leveraged Iran into a position where their only real option to retaliate is by 
attacking.”28 Iranian aggression in modern day comes on the heels of unprecedented economic 
sanctions implemented by the United States, allocation of American troops to Saudi Arabia, 
and     the assassination of an Iranian General in a targeted drone strike. Subsequently, the 
inability to confidently predict that Iran will not attack the U.S. indicates that traditional 
deterrence methodologies have not achieved the objective of the NDS. As highlighted in the 
introduction to this paper, American National Security documents focus primarily on the 
actions of larger more capable nation states. However, strategic actions taken by Iran have 
kept the United States from moving forward in an even more aggressive militaristic manner. 
This research finds that Iran has successfully implemented the tactic of dissuasion 
against the United States. With that said, as additional evidence that there is a “hole” in 
American defense policy planning, it can be argued that Iran fulfilled the objective of 
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deterrence   outlined in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2009 Quadrennial Roles and 
Missions Review (QRM). The Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2009 Quadrennial Roles and 
Missions Review defines deterrence operations as “integrated, systematic efforts to exercise 
decisive influence over adversaries’ decision-making calculus in peacetime, crisis, and war.”29 
Deterrence in the contemporary sense possesses far too broad of a meaning. The 
broad use of the term “deterrence” in the NDS (and now the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and 
Missions Review) outlines a legacy of misinterpreting deterrence tactics and undercutting 
dissuasion. “Without mentioning whom or what is being deterred, the word can refer to 
either nuclear deterrence or conventional deterrence, and to either retaliatory or first strike 
attacks.”30 Or, with respect to this paper, deterrence operations (based on the quote from 
QRM) can also be interpreted as dissuasion. 
This research argues that the tactic of dissuasion which has been used by Iran has also 
been used in contemporary instances. For example, Taiwan has successfully dissuaded China 
from taking more drastic military measures in the midst of the contentious relationship 
between the two states. And, North Korea, on the “brink of war” with the United States 
following the election of President Donald Trump, kept the US from retaliating in a severely 
militaristic manner. The common denominator between each of the offered historic examples 
is one militarily and economically superior nation engaging in a contentious relationship with 
a militarily and economically inferior nation. The byproduct is that of dissuasion being 
wielded by  the inferior state. 
Dissuasion and North Korea 
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Similarly to Iran, North Korea has leveraged the tactic of dissuasion against the 
United States. “The U.S. has frequently used unilateral sanctions against many countries as a 
regular tenet of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.”31 In fact, roughly “75 
percent of the world's nearly 200 countries were subject to U.S. sanctions as of 2000.”32 The 
United States followed the hard power tactic of sanctioning through implementation against 
the North Korean    regime. US sanctions against North Korea have entailed tremendous 
economic costs to the regime, but they have mostly failed to change the behavior of North 
Korean leadership.33 The failed hard power tactic of sanctions continued to fail into the 
Presidency of Donald J. Trump. And, outside of economic sanctions, militaristically-oriented 
hard power tactics failed into the Trump presidency as well. 
In regards to militaristically-oriented hard power, the United States has implemented 
tactics which far outnumber the examples which are outlined in this paper. However, under 
the Trump Administration, militar-oriented hard power tactics which have been utilized 
include (but are not limited to) flying US B1-B strategic bombers near North Korea’s coast, 
the   farthest north they have flown in the 21st century34 in September of 2017, a joint United 
States and South Korean military exercise (19-2 Dong Maeng) in August of 201935, and the 
sustainment of American troops along the demilitarized zone of the Korean Peninsula. 
What was the ultimate goal of casting economic sanctions and military tactics under the 
umbrella of hard power toward North Korea? The objective of the United States against North 
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Korea was to denuclearize North Korea and dampen militaristic aggressiveness of the DPRK. 
In  other words, the United States aimed to deter North Korea from continuing pursuit of 
nuclear weapons and cease conducting provocative military operations. Similarly to economic 
sanctions,  military deterrence mostly failed to change the behavior of North Korean leadership. 
The contemporary actions of North Korea have shown little success of American 
deterrence. As recently as March first of 2020, North Korea launched two short-range 
projectiles,    believed to be the KN-2536. On March 9th, North Korea conducted a test launch of 
three projectiles as part of joint strike drills that included multiple types of rocket launchers37. 
On March 30th, the DPRK launched two short-range ballistic missiles, believed to be the KN-
25, marking its fourth missile test of the year at that point.38 And, on April 14th, North Korea 
tested a series of short-range missiles which marked North Korea's first launch of a cruise 
missile in nearly three years.39 North Korea has shown minimal desire to adhere to American 
desires, and pressed forward despite American deterrence efforts. 
The United States, in relation to North Korea, is the far superior nation when it comes 
to hard power capabilities. However, somehow, the North Korean leadership has steered 
strategy and actions in a manner which has influenced the nature of the military competition. 
North Korea  has used dissuasion to guide the United States into avoiding more drastic military 
action. 
 
Dissuasion and Taiwan 
 










States, another instance of dissuasion which this paper argues is utilized by Taiwan against 
China. It is important to note that there is a different dynamic of relations between Taiwan 
and   China when compared to the relationship between the United States and North Korea. 
Specifically, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) views the island (Taiwan) as a province, 
while in Taiwan - a territory with its own democratically elected government that is home to 
twenty-three million people - political leaders have differing views on the island’s status and 
relations with the mainland.40 Taiwan has taken steps to defy the notion of being a province 
of mainland China. Political frictions shadow the relationship, and China and Taiwan have 
experienced a renewal in tensions under new leadership.41 Nonetheless, dissuasion, through 
steering strategy and actions in a manner which influence the nature of military competition, 
has  been wielded by Taiwanese leadership. 
China, as part of its continued military expansion, has deployed missiles along the 
Taiwan Strait and periodically conducted drills near the island of Taiwan. China has also gone 
as  far as sending bombers, fighter jets, and an aircraft carrier over and around the strait as 
shows of force.42 The objective of flexing militaristic hard power capabilities on behalf of 
China has been to accomplish the definition of deterrence outlined by The Brookings 
Institution. Ultimately, China has attempted to convince Taiwan that the risks and costs of 
considering formal diplomatic    relations with other major powers and international 
organizations (essential if Taiwan is to survive separately from the Communist mainland)43 far 
outweigh any gains that they might hope to achieve. Despite hard power deterrence efforts by 
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China, Taiwan has continued to take steps which lean toward independence from mainland 
China. 
In January of 2019, Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
of Taiwan, rejected the 1992 Consensus.44 For context, the 1992 Consensus outlines that 
there is only “one China” but allows for differing interpretations, by which both Beijing and 
Taipei agree  that Taiwan belongs to China. The tacit agreement underlying the 1992 
Consensus is that Taiwan will not seek independence.45 Moreover, Taiwan has fostered a 
relationship with the United States in relation to arms sales which is in direct opposition of 
Chinese desires. In fact, between 2007 and 2018, US Arms Sales to Taiwan have totaled 
over $25 billion.46 
The Trump administration also seemed to be deepening ties with Taiwan over 
Chinese objections, proposing multiple arms deals and unveiling a new $250 million 
complex for its de facto embassy in Taipei.47 So, this paper must consider the ramifications 
and intentions of these actions from the standpoint of the Taiwanese. This paper proposes 
that Taiwan is leveraging a relationship with the United States to influence the nature of 
military competition with China. Factors such as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which 
allows for arms sales to Taiwan for self- defense and does not rule out the possibility of the 
United States defending Taiwan from Chinese attack, is a policy known as strategic 
ambiguity.48 Strategic ambiguity is a layer within dissuasion which aims to steer the nature 
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In full, China has used distinct militarily-oriented hard power capabilities as an effort 
to deter Taiwan. It is undoubtedly true that China is the superior hard power capable nation in 
comparison to Taiwan. With that said, factors such as the Taiwan Relations Act, entertaining 
arms deals with the Trump administration, and unveiling a new $250 million complex for its 
de facto embassy in Taipei are complicating the effectiveness of hard power deterrence efforts 
of China. Strategic ambiguity has provided a path for Taiwan to continue with undesired 




Given the challenges faced and shortcomings revealed during strategy formulation 
experiences, there is a chorus of outside experts and commentators who argue that the strategy 
formulation process is broken.49 Dissuasion, according to this paper, is one of the factors which 
are contributing to contemporary strategy formulation challenges. According to CSIS, Barry 
Watts and Andrew Krepinevich, complain that, “the ability of the U.S. national security 
establishment to craft, implement, and adapt effective long-term strategies against intelligent 
adversaries at acceptable costs has been declining for some decades.”50 Refraining from 
incorporating and considering dissuasion as a tactic which is wielded by lesser nation states falls 
into the declining ability to craft, implement, and adapt effective long-term strategies against 
intelligent adversaries. 
Frank Hoffman notes half a dozen authors who criticize the processes and results and 
complains that “too often the edges of risk, assumptions, and alternatives are sanded off at 
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lower levels”.51 According to CSIS and Frank Hoffman, the criticisms note a wide range of 
failings: lack of clear priorities, “lowest common denominator” recommendations resulting 
from development by consensus, lack of candor driven by fear of alienating some interest 
group, weak connections between strategy and resources, slowness in responding to changes in 
the national security environment, and a high staff burden.52 Should the United States 
incorporate dissuasion in national security documents to plan for intelligent but less-capable 
adversaries leveraging the tactic, this research finds that ailments associated with clarity of 
priorities will be alleviated. 
Comprehensively, this paper has highlighted how dissuasion is leveraged as a tactic 
within the international community. Examples of contemporary relationships have been used to 
reinforce the finding of a contemporary need to fill the present gap in national security 
strategizing. The arguments of this research ought to be contemplated as a component toward a  
path forward for US policymakers and the defense community at large in the pursuit of 
overcoming challenges faced and shortcomings experienced in national security strategy 
formulation. 
This research finds that there must be propositions of substance which provide a path 
toward remedying the ailments of current shortcomings in American national security planning. 
With that said, propositions must also balance strategy and resources as is explained by CSIS and 
Frank Hoffman. This research proposes revising documents of national security to adequately 
address the tactic of dissuasion. First and foremost, the National Defense Strategy ought to 
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include a more comprehensive consideration of dissuasion being used by less-capable nation 
states against the United States. As was specified in the early portions of this paper, the NDS is 
lacking in addressing dissuasion. Specifically, the NDS should “spotlight” Iran and explain 
exactly how the     rouge nation state is wielding dissuasion. Simply, the National Defense Strategy 
can reference the same credible sources which comprise the arguments of this paper. 
A more prudent crafting of the National Defense Strategy in the future may include 
acknowledging The Brookings Institution description of potentially foreseeable future attacks 
being conducted by Iran against U.S. instillations in Iraq. It may also be prudent for the NDS to 
reiterate, in the same section which “spotlights” Iran, that anticipated future attacks outlined by 
The Brookings Institution align with the definition of dissuasion offered by the 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Review. Specifically, there ought to be language which emphasizes that Iran   is utilizing 
strategy and actions, influencing the nature of future military competitions, channeling threats in 
certain directions, and therefore complicating military planning for The United States.53 
The proper recognition and acknowledgment of dissuasion being used by Iran as an 
explicit tactic in the NDS will allow policymakers to frame their congressional testimonial 
questioning accordingly. Should the NDS provide a credible platform which explains 
dissuasion and how it is indeed a contemporary issue, there will be a foundation which elected 
members of Congress can use as a guide to ask more targeted questions in open and closed 
hearings regarding the status-quo of American defense policy planning. Ideally, members of 
congress will    ask how the U.S. intends to move forward with shaping future strategies to meet 
the needs of emerging and present threats which are contingent on the ability of states like 
Iran leveraging the    tactic of dissuasion. This will be fleshed out in detail in the conclusion of 
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Having the NDS as a credible platform to reinforce targeted questioning in the midst of 
open and closed testimony will allow defense committees of Congress to incorporate answers 
of the respective questions into the annual formulation of the National Defense Authorization 
Act. The incorporation of hearing testimony derived from the newly reinforced foundation of 
the NDS will yield what this paper believes will be immediate results in combatting dissuasion 
being exploited against the United States. Essentially, the simple incorporation of what 
dissuasion is, and where it is a contemporary issue, in the NDS, will give policymakers an 
opportunity to refine    strategies for the future through targeted questioning in open and closed 
hearings. 
This research also finds that there is a need for a remedy related to dissuasion which will 
fall under the Executive Branch of the United States. Again, in relation to the formulation of 
national security     documents, the second proposition this paper offers is combatting dissuasion 
through the President of the United States acknowledging and recognizing dissuasion as a tactic 
by less-capable states in the National Security Strategy (NSS). If the President may properly 
acknowledge and recognize the obstacles which dissuasion is contemporarily presenting, the 
NDS and NSS can both be used as a foundation for testimonial questioning by elected members 
of Congress. Particularly, the NSS will also allow members of Congress to ask targeted 
questions for    future dissuasion-oriented obstacles outside of Iran. 
Dissuasion-focused content of the Nation Security Strategy may be done in a regional 
context. The proposition of this research for the Executive Branch is ideal considering that the 
most    recent NSS possesses a section which explicitly focuses on Strategy in a Regional 
Context. The current NSS section of Strategy in a Regional Context spotlights the Indo-




Pacific, Europe, Middle East, South and Central Asia, Western Hemisphere, and Africa.54 As 
is highlighted previously, several contemporary instances of dissuasion being used 
internationally fall in several  regional locations. For example, dissuasion is being used by Iran 
in the Middle East, Taiwan is using dissuasion against China in Southeast Asia, and North 
Korea is also using dissuasion against the United States in East Asia. Should the NSS provide 
an additional platform for members of Congress to ask targeted questions regarding 
dissuasion-oriented scenarios outside of the Middle East (Iran), this paper anticipates that 
policymakers will be able to play a greater role in addressing dissuasion throughout the globe. 
Dissuasion, based off of the arguments of this research, is indeed a real and present threat 
to defense planning of the United States. That being said, it is advised in this paper to also 
consider dissuasion as a potentially emerging threat in future scenarios of national security 
formulation. Dr. Robert Haffa at Johns Hopkins University claims that the full landscape of the 
emerging new great power competition is yet to be established. As international power 
potentially shifts according to the development of international affairs, this paper believes it is 
not out of the realm of possibility that dissuasion may be wielded by other less-capable nation 
states which are unseen at this current moment and unrecognized in this paper. 
Properly addressing the tactic of dissuasion in documents of national security such as 
the NDS and the NSS will allow members of Congress to ask targeted testimonial questions 
which meet the needs of present and future instances of dissuasion. The ultimate objective, in 
present day, ought to be providing an avenue for lawmakers to start incorporating useful 
feedback from testimony into the National Defense Authorization Act. The incorporation of 
testimonial answers     related to dissuasion will facilitate the passing of legislation focused on 
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dissuasion-related issues.     Subsequently, there can be an expectation of beginning to close this 



















Dissuasion, according to the first chapter of this thesis, is a tactic which has been 
wielded     against the United States. The preceding chapter of this thesis also explains that 




dissuasion is inherently different than deterrence because dissuasion can be used by any and all 
nation states. The attribute of being at the disposal of any country is notable. Particularly, when 
compared to dissuasion, deterrence can only be wielded by nations which possesses hard power 
capabilities such as economic or militaristic superiority. Of course, the concept of hard power 
only being accessible to countries with economic or militaristic superiority is also explained in 
the preceding chapter of this thesis. 
In order to pragmatically construct American policy, policymakers must possess an 
adequate understanding of dissuasion and the ways in which it has been intertwined with 
American policy historically. Particularly, it is critical for policy makers and scholars to 
recognize where dissuasion has been leveraged by the United States itself. The preceding  
chapter addressed the differences between dissuasion and deterrence. Chapter two, 
subsequently, is allocated toward fleshing out how the United States itself has used dissuasion, 
but not classified or categorized dissuasion appropriately. 
Dissecting three historical instances of American-implemented dissuasive tactics is the 
most manageable way to highlight how dissuasion has been utilized in American policy. This 
paper will highlight where dissuasion has clearly been utilized in American policy, but not been 
labeled or categorized as such. The three instances this research will address are the Iran 
Nuclear  Deal (JCPOA), the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and bolstering nuclear ambiguity for 
Israel at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War. As a baseline derived from chapter one of this 
thesis, dissuasion will be acknowledged as “utilizing strategy and actions, to influence the 
nature of future military competitions, channeling threats in certain directions, and complicating 




military planning for adversaries.”55 Additionally, this chapter will discuss how dissuasion 
possesses diplomacy as an attribute, and how the lack of explicit threats (hard power) 
differentiates dissuasion from deterrence. Comprehensively, this paper will discuss targeted 
American strategy   and policy examples which illuminate how the United States has leveraged 
dissuasion in American policy historically. 
 
Literature Review 
Schools of Thought: 
“The dictionary tells us that power means an ability to do things and control others, to 
get   others to do what they otherwise would not do.”56 Joseph Nye, in regards to international 
relations, expounds upon the definition of power through articulating that the definition does 
not   have one narrow everlasting meaning. Rather, the understanding of power in international 
relations is somewhat fluid. Specifically, the dynamic of power in international relations is a 
byproduct of a consistently changing international landscape. Therefore, if not periodically 
revised to keep pace with an ever-changing international landscape, the concept of power 
begins   to yield gaps in knowledge. 
Nye explains that the definition of power is losing emphasis on military force and 
conquest that marked earlier eras. Specifically, “factors such as technology, education, and 
economic growth are becoming more significant in international power, while geography, 
population, and raw materials are becoming less important”.57 Though the dynamic of power in 
international relations shifts as factors fluctuate in significance, there are still two fundamental 
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camps of defining power: hard power and soft power. 
Contemporarily, the “fragmentation of world politics into many different spheres has 
made power resources less fungible, that is, less transferrable from sphere to sphere”.58 Nye 
explains that the direct use of force, for economic gain in the sense, is generally too costly and 
dangerous for modern great nation states to risk.59 Therefore, alternative tactics must be pursued 
by prominent nation states on the international stage to accomplish respective objectives and 
needs. 
The point of fungibility outlined by Nye is a threshold which determines the use of 
hard power or soft power. If the direct use of force (hard power) is too costly and dangerous to 
risk, soft power must be pursued. It is critical to fill the gaps in knowledge which appear as 
the international landscape shifts relating to the two camps of hard and soft power. Currently, 
the tactic of dissuasion falls under the umbrella of soft power. Deterrence, on the other hand, 
falls under the umbrella of explicit hard power. Despite dissuasion and deterrence possessing 
distinctly different characteristics which align them with the categories of hard and soft power, 
dissuasion and deterrence are typically lumped into the same generic category inappropriately. 
Deterrence vs. Dissuasion – Wrongful Synonymous Association: 
Most literature surrounding international security gives relatively short and unfulfilling 
 
explanations from where the term “deterrence” is derived.60 Additionally, the term “deterrence” is 
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relations.7 The 2001 QDR, however, “employed the term in broader ways that reflect its usage in 
the English language”61. It is understandable how the two tactics are frequently paired as one in 
the same. However, within the context of the current international landscape, deterrence and 
dissuasion  fulfill different policy functions and attributes as they did under the key strategic 
goals laid out by Donald Rumsfeld. 
“The word ‘de-terrence’ in English consists of two parts that go back to (at least) 
ancient Latin. The ‘de’-prefix in ‘de’-terrence – similarly to so many other common verbs like 
deflect, depart, detach, derail, deviate, defend etc. – connotes ‘away from’.”62 Moreover, “The 
‘-terrence’ part will for most people (accurately) trigger associations with the word ‘terror’, 
which derives from the Latin verb terrere ‘fill with fear, frighten’.”63 According to Yar Batoh, 
“those two components – 1) to use ‘fear’ to 2) push somebody ‘away from’ a course of action 
they may want to pursue – do indeed appear to be two foundational definitional building blocks 
that we find back in all disciplines in which deterrence is a focus of theoretical and/or practical 
inquiry”.64  
Keeping the roots of the term “deterrence” in mind, dissuasion in international relations 
takes a different form. “The ability to sway a third party – can take two basic forms. One form 
entails the ability to make somebody not pursue an intended course of action. This is what the 
Nobel Prize laureate Thomas Schelling called deterrence.”65 By definition, deterrence-motivated 
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refrainment from a desired action is rooted in an underlying or overt threat should the action be 
pursued. Dissuasion, as a separate tactic, refers to guiding somebody to do something out of their 
own volition.66 Volition, would be acting out of will. The decision of taking a specific course of 
action out of will of is a critical distinction when compared to taking a specific course of action 
out   of fear of an implied threat. 
Glen Snyder defined deterrence by denial as “the capability to deny the other party any 
 
gains from the move which is to be deterred”.67 Davis elucidates that Snyder was explaining a 
 
distinction from the commonplace interpretation of deterrence. This is problematic because 
“extending the definition of deterrence beyond its threat-of-punishment meaning obfuscates 
distinctions on which critical reasoning and effective communication depend”.68 Therefore, in 
order to reduce obfuscation and wrongful synonymous association, dissuasion must be 
 
considered as its own respective tactic; not simply another form of deterrence (deterrence by 
denial). Comprehensively, dissuasion falls under the umbrella of soft power and deterrence falls 
under the umbrella of hard power. There is a clear distinction between the tactics of deterrence 
and dissuasion. Therefore, there ought to be a scholarly line which is clarified and established to 
avoid misclassification. Batoh has attempted to explain this distinction between the two tactics 
in   a theory of suasion matrix. 
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Dissuasion, as articulated by Batoh, “refers not to what is to be achieved but to how – 
the  means that are employed to get there”.69 Therefore, according to Batoh, there must be two 
conceivable options with this distinction. Simply, one of those options involves positive 
incentives (carrots), the other relies on disincentives (sticks).70 Batoh provides a matrix which 
sets parameters for this theory which he refers to as Suasion Matrix - Theory. 
“These two dimensions – what do we want to achieve and how can we achieve it – lead   
to a 2-by-2 matrix with four different cells, all of which can be populated with a number of 
concrete capability, policy, concepts and or ecosystem options.”71 According to Batoh, “the top 
left cell is about making one’s own preferred course of action (COA) of another nation state also 
preferable to that respective state (seduction, coaxing, etc.). The bottom left is about making all 
options other than one’s own desired COA to be unpalatable to another nation state (intimidation, 
bullying, etc.)”.72 Leftover are the cells in the top and bottom right corners. “The bottom right 
cell is about making one’s own undesired COA by another nation state unpalatable to that state 
(threaten, discourage, etc.). The top right cell is about making some alternative, less undesirable 
COAs of another nation state more attractive to that respective state (bribery, side-payments, 
etc.).”19 Moreover, Batoh explains that “the top left and bottom right are about changing the 
target’s perception about one COA”.73  
The Suasion Matrix, according to Batoh, encountered obstacles of its own. “In the 
multiple sessions where experimentation was conducted with this matrix, there was difficulty 
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labeling the cells.”74 Difficulty labeling the cells is a byproduct and indication of the gap in 
knowledge which currently exists due to muddied lines between the tactics of dissuasion and 
deterrence. The matrix provided by Batoh solely focuses on dissuasion and persuasion; both of 
which utilize “carrots” and “sticks” as incentives. 
Conclusion: 
 
The Suasion Matrix provided by Batoh will make more sense if dissuasion is viewed as 
“carrots”, and deterrence is viewed as “sticks”; both of which can promote or repel COA’s by 
another nation state. For example, dissuasion promotion of a respective COA by another nation 
state will be accomplished through “carrots’ such as seduction, coaxing, and other similar soft 
methods. Dissuasion repellence of a respective COA by another nation state will also be 
accomplished through “carrots” such as bribery, distractions, and other similar soft methods. 
Both the desire to promote or repel an action of another nation state can be achieved through 
dissuasive tactics listed in this paragraph. However, the critical distinction of dissuasive tactics is 
that they are leveraged with soft methods known as “carrots”. 
If deterrence is viewed as “sticks”, deterrence promotion of a respective COA by 
another   nation state will be accomplished through “sticks” such as intimidation, bullying, 
threatening, and other similar methods. Deterrence repellence of a respective COA by another 
nation state will be achieved through overtly implementing sanctions, some sort of attack, or 
other similar tactics. Both the desire to promote or repel an action of another nation state can 
be achieved through deterrence tactics listed in this paragraph. However, the important 
distinction is that the means to accomplish deterrence objectives is with “sticks”. 
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In order to contribute to clarifying the muddied lines between dissuasion and deterrence, 
the research following this literature review will delve into instances where dissuasion has been 
used by the United States against other nation states. Specifically, acts of dissuasion by the 
United States which will be fleshed out to show how they align with the parameters of dissuasion 
outlined in the conclusion of this literature review. Ultimately, the research which this literature 
review precedes will contribute to refining the matrix theory outlined by Bartoh, clarify how 
dissuasion has historically been used by the United States, and clarify dissuasion’s distinction 
when compared to deterrence. 
 
Methods Section: 
According to Sharon Crasnow, “political science research, particularly in the areas of 
international relations and comparative politics, has increasingly become dominated by statistical 
and formal approaches, sometimes loosely—and not completely accurately—grouped together as 
‘quantitative methods’”.75 Moreover, Crasnow explains that “the promise of these approaches—
that is, formal methods, such as rational choice and game theory, and powerful statistical 
methods, such as multiple regression analysis fueled by the increasingly sophisticated use of 
statistical software packages—has shifted the methodological emphasis away from the traditional 
case study method of political science, a method that was predominantly qualitative”.76 The 
recent blending of statistical and formal approaches laid out by Crasnow is integral to 
understanding the method which was undertaken to pursue the research for this thesis. 
The research undertaken in this research aims to refrain from utilizing a blended method 
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of statistical and formal approaches. Rather, due to the theoretical nature of this research, this 
paper    focuses on a classic method of case study which leans on qualitative information which is 
exploratory, descriptive, interpretive, and explanatory. Particularly, the definitions of 
deterrence and dissuasion, laid out in the literature review and chapter conclusion, are 
unpacked based on the aforementioned case study components. 
This paper can be expected to focus on differentiating dissuasion from deterrence in a 
historical context. Through the use of exploration, description, interpretation, and explanation, 
this paper compellingly finds that dissuasion is indeed different than deterrence, and has been 
used by the United States in American policy. Crasnow explains that “although increasingly 
popular in political science—a trend transported from economics— experiments are not always 
possible, for a variety of reasons. Therefore, observational evidence continues to play an 
important role in the field”.77 The method adopted by this research illuminates the findings by 
leaning heavily on historical observational evidence. 
All in all, it is important to note that the method undertaken to construct the research 
aims to   avoid the pitfall of inaccurately grouping formal and statistical approaches while 
discussing a topic which is theoretical in nature. On the contrary, this paper works to present a 
new view on deterrence, and clarify misconceptions between deterrence and dissuasion through 
a more traditional method of study. Of course, statistical methods were considered for this 
research. Though, it is not believed that adopting a statistically-focused method of research 
would have  crafted the most compelling case for distinguishing a difference between the 
utilization of deterrence and dissuasion in American policy. 
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Presentation and Discussion of Results 
 
Iran Nuclear Deal - Exemplar of American Dissuasion: 
Regardless of political opinion, or personal convictions regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal 
coming to fruition, there is credible reason to view the deal as a tactic of dissuasion implemented 
by the United States. “After the presidential elections of 14 June 2013, Iran’s Hassan Rouhani 
proved that he was introducing changes in the country’s foreign policy based on cooperation and 
moderation as he did when he was nuclear negotiator. The outlook of Rouhani, therefore, created 
opportunities and opened the door for a rapprochement between Iran and the West.”78 The 
objective of the Iran nuclear deal, according to President Barack Obama, was to “cut off every 
single one of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear program, a nuclear weapons program”.79 The objective 
of the deal, at its core, was to preserve American and international security by obstructing the 
procurement of a nuclear bomb by an unpredictable and dangerous state (Iran). 
It is clear that the Iran nuclear deal was not a tactic of deterrence. Deterrence, explained 
during a hearing with the Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC), is a basic equation: 
deny the aim of an adversary, or convince the adversary that the cost of pursuing an objective is 
too great.80 The Iran nuclear deal did not convince Iran that the cost of pursuing a nuclear bomb 
was too great. On the contrary, the Iran nuclear deal utilized strategy to influence the nature of 
future military competition. The JCPOA guided Iran into acting out of its own volition, as 
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opposed to forcing Iran into making a fear-based decision. The United States pursued and 
enacted a deal with Iran that, according to the Obama Administration, mitigated the likelihood 
of military competition oriented around a landscape that was comprised of Iran possessing a 
nuclear weapon. The United    States, through the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, 
wielded dissuasion by guiding Iran into making a decision by their own volition. 
 It is important to understand that the Iran Nuclear Deal was a tactic of dissuasion when 
the tactic of deterrence was still a viable option. In fact, the Iran nuclear deal was diplomatic in 
nature which is not an attribute of deterrence, but is indeed an attribute of dissuasion. Brian 
Rathbun explains that “if those in a position of leverage always adopt coercive bargaining, then 
diplomacy matters little. Moreover, if the strong always get their way, diplomacy is not 
important”.81 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was not deterrence because the 
deal did not rely on coercion. And, the primary party of strength, the United States, did not 
entirely get its way either. 
The JCPOA utilized strategy rooted in diplomacy to influence the nature of future 
military competition, and targeted policy which dissuaded Iran from initiating potential future 
military conflict by having a nuclear weapon. It is apparent that the JCPOA was a clear tactic of 
dissuasion, but could have filled an even greater dissuasive capacity if it had been continued or 
reinvented by the Trump Administration. Building upon the JCPOA, or reinventing the JCPOA 
could have addressed sunset provisions, Iranian support for terrorism, and the future of Iranian 
ballistic missile programs in a way that did not rely on economic sanctions or militaristic 
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Rathbun explains that “while some restrictions in the deal would have expired or 
‘sunset’ at different points and would have needed to be addressed in the future, other 
restrictions lasted more than a decade, and some lasted forever”.82 The restrictions in the 
Obama Administrations JCPOA that lasted forever permanently influenced the nature of future 
military conflict between the United States and Iranian regime. If the sunset provisions had 
been altered or modified by the Trump administration to last forever, that also would have 
influenced the nature of potential future military conflict between the United States and Iran. 
The path of diplomacy is a decision by the Obama Administration which posed a stark 
difference to the contemporary approach by the Trump Administration. The contemporary 
approach of interacting with Iran which has been implemented by the Trump Administration has 
been deterrence-oriented. For example, President Donald Trump has undertaken a maximum 
economic pressure campaign of sanctioning the Iranian regime, assassinated Iranian General 
Soleimani, and ultimately withdrew from the dissuasive Iranian nuclear deal.83 If dissuasion were 
indeed the same as deterrence, the JCPOA would have been a strongly considered avenue for the 
Trump Administration to pursue. President Donald Trump has proven with his rhetoric that hard 
power deterrence is his ideal choice of response to a threatening Iranian regime. In January of 
2020, President Trump leveraged deterrence-oriented rhetoric from the Oval Office by saying, 
“let this serve as a warning that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have 
targeted 52 Iranian sites that will be hit very fast and very hard. The USA wants no more 
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It is important to recognize that the Trump administration has undertaken a deterrence- 
oriented approach against Iran, because that approach proves that the United States is a hard 
power capable nation state in the relationship between America and Iran. That being said, it is 
also important to recognize that the Obama Administration leveraged dissuasion against Iran 
with the JCPOA. It is critical to recognize that the United States has used both deterrence and 
dissuasion against Iran in the two most recent Presidential administrations, because the 
utilization of both tactics highlights that both dissuasion and deterrence can be wielded by a 
superior nation state. That being said, the ultimate concept which the Iranian nuclear deal should 
promote, is that the United States has indeed used dissuasion in American policy. The JCPOA is 
a historical instance of American dissuasion. 
 
Taiwan Relations Act, Strategic Ambiguity, and American Dissuasion: 
Chapter one of this thesis discussed the manner in which Taiwan utilized dissuasion 
against mainland China. Specifically, Taiwan leveraged the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as a 
form of strategic ambiguity to increase the likelihood of mainland China choosing to refrain 
from attacking Taiwan. As mentioned in the preceding chapter of this thesis, the Taiwan 
Relations Act allows for arms sales from the United States to Taiwan for self-defense and does 
not rule out the possibility of the United States defending Taiwan from Chinese attack. This is a 
policy known as strategic ambiguity.85 Due to the lack of hard power deterrence capability of 
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Taiwan, the TRA is certainly an instance of Taiwan wielding dissuasion against China. The 
TRA is also an instance of the United States wielding dissuasion against China. As previously 
mentioned, dissuasion is “utilizing strategy and actions to influence the nature of future military 
competitions, and channels threats in certain directions complicating military planning for 
adversaries”.86 The TRA accomplishes the objectives in the aforementioned sentence for 
Taiwan and the United States alike. Strategic ambiguity benefits the Taiwanese, as well as the 
United States. The realization of     the TRA as a tactic of dissuasion on behalf of the United States 
again shows that dissuasion can and has been wielded by a deterrence-capable nation state. In 
this case, the deterrence-capable state is America. 
The premise of the TRA being a form of dissuasion by the US (instead of deterrence) is 
oriented around the lack of an explicit threat from the United States against China. The lack of 
an  explicit threat from the United States is an important distinction between dissuasion and 
deterrence. For example, Karl Mueller articulates that threat of punishment is the approach most 
strongly associated with deterrence, and involves nonmilitary (economic) and military action.87 
Therefore, because there is not an explicit threat from the United States against China in regards 
to the ambiguity provided to Taiwan by the TRA, this thesis research interprets the TRA as a 
tactic of dissuasion implemented by the United States. Moreover, the TRA is a diplomatic 
interaction between the United States and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
diplomacy is a trait of dissuasion, but not of deterrence. Subsequently, it is clear that the TRA is 
not a tactic of deterrence. Rather, the TRA is a tactic of dissuasion. 
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 It is no secret that the United States and China are two major super powers battling 
within  the contemporary great power competition. Therefore, it is useful for American 
policymakers to enhance American superiority by establishing an American-friendly democracy 
just off of the coast of China. The Taiwan Relations Act facilitates accomplishing that objective 
by injecting strategic ambiguity into the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China. 
In order to further understand how the United States diplomatically wielded dissuasion with 
the TRA through Taiwan, it is critical to understand strategic ambiguity in depth. Baliga 
explains that “countries sometimes try to create ambiguity about their military 
capabilities”.88 Or, in the case of the United States with Taiwan, create ambiguity about the 
support from a country   (United States) with significant military capabilities. Strategic 
ambiguity has been used many times historically. One particularly significant historical 
example is that of Saddam Hussein in the early and late 1990’s. “Saddam Hussein possessed 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the early 1990s but not in the late 1990s, and 
deliberately chose a policy of ambiguity in both situations because he felt it worked to his 
advantage.”89  
According to Baliga, “a country that lacks WMDs may use strategic ambiguity to create 
‘deterrence by doubt’.”90 Respectfully, this research does not agree with Baliga in the 
interpretation of strategic ambiguity being a form of deterrence (by doubt). On the contrary, 
Baliga is explaining a distinction from the commonplace interpretation of deterrence. It is 
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problematic to classify strategic ambiguity as “deterrence by doubt” for the same reason it is 
problematic to categorize the capability to deny another party any gains from a move which is 
to   be deterred91 as “deterrence by denial”. As mentioned in the literature review of this chapter, 
“extending the definition of deterrence beyond its threat-of-punishment meaning obfuscates 
distinctions on which critical reasoning and effective communication depend”.92 
In the case of Saddam Hussein, Hussein felt that the perception he may have WMDs 
was valuable to project strength. For example, “when Saddam Hussein revealed to his inner 
circle that Iraq had no WMDs, he flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts 
to the contrary because he thought such a revelation would embolden his enemies to attack.”93 
The concept understood by Saddam Hussein is similar to that of Taiwan and the United States 
regarding the TRA. 
Ambiguity has also been leveraged by Israel. “Israel’s policy of strategic ambiguity on 
nuclear weapons may be ‘a way of creating a deterrent, without making it explicit’”.94 Again, this 
research suggests Israel is using dissuasion as opposed to deterrence, because extending the 
definition of deterrence beyond its threat-of-punishment meaning obfuscates distinctions on 
which critical reasoning and effective communication depend.95 Taiwan, Israel, and Saddam 
Hussein all utilized dissuasion. And, arguably, all of the players mentioned in the previous 
sentence can be viewed as less-capable nation states in comparison to the primary adversaries 
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their dissuasion tactics were directed against. The fact that strategic ambiguity was used by 
less-capable nation states against economically or militaristically superior adversaries shows 
that strategic ambiguity is a form of dissuasion, because hard-power deterrence was not a tool 
at their    disposal. 
In the case of the United States, Taiwan, and the TRA, strategic ambiguity is simply a 
layer within dissuasion to guide mainland China away from conducting a military strike against 
Taiwan. As was    mentioned earlier in the introduction of this thesis chapter, dissuasion can be 
leveraged by deterrence-capable parties and non-deterrence capable parties. Therefore, because 
there is no explicit threat from the United States, the injection of strategic ambiguity into the 
relationship between Taiwan and China through the TRA is an example of American dissuasion. 
 
Israel, Nuclear Ambiguity, and American Dissuasion: 
If dissuasion is simply “utilizing strategy and actions to channel threats in certain 
directions, and complicate military planning for adversaries”96, it can be gathered that the United 
States bolstering Israel’s nuclear ambiguity is another instance of American dissuasion being 
implemented in American policy. “Israel is the world’s oldest closet nuclear state. For more 
than forty years it has neither confirmed nor denied its possession of nuclear weapons, and has 
vowed not to be the first to ‘introduce’ nuclear weapons into the Middle East (with the 
definition of ‘introduce’ being left intentionally vague).”97 
Moreover, Vipin Narang explains that Israel has circulated enough credible rumors to 
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support the assertion that Israel does indeed possesses nuclear weapons.98 The deliberate 
ambiguity leveraged by Israel, similar to that of Taiwan with the TRA, can be viewed as a tactic 
of dissuasion against superior adversaries. Though, for the purposes of this chapter, this research 
will be analyzing how the United States has diplomatically facilitated the ambiguity perpetuated 
by Israel. Thus, this section will once again highlight how dissuasion has historically been used 
by the United States. 
 The United States has leaned on Israel as a pawn in the struggle for influence over the 
Middle East. “The specter of atomic warfare in the Middle East has placed the region's 
nuclearization at the heart not only of US-Israeli relations, but also at the center of Israel's 
drive   to preserve its regional nuclear hegemony.”99 Considering that the specter of atomic 
warfare in the Middle East has placed nuclearization at the heart of US-Israeli relations, it is 
critical to assesses and understand how the United States has deliberately contributed to the 
credibility of  Israel possessing nuclear weapons. Additionally, it is important to understand 
how the United States has also deliberately contributed to the continued ambiguity of Israel 
possessing nuclear   weapons. A clear understanding of the aforementioned roles of the United 
States will highlight how dissuasion was deliberately utilized in American policy. 
The beginning of the Persian Gulf War is a clear instance of where American policy with 
Israel supported the notion of Israel possibly possessing nuclear weapons, as well as upheld the 
nuclear ambiguity Israel has sought to project. “Once the Persian Gulf War began, and Iraq 
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launched Scud missiles against Israel, the United States adopted a two-track policy of publicly 
acknowledging an Israeli right to respond with nonconventional weapons to an Iraqi chemical 
attack, while privately counseling the Shamir government to exercise restraint.”100 The decision 
 
to acknowledge an Israeli right to respond with nonconventional weapons to an Iraqi chemical 
attack is a clear decision to support the assertion that Israel potentially possessed nuclear 
weapons. However, by the United States refraining from overtly expressing that Israel did 
indeed  have nuclear weapons, the US contributed to the nuclear ambiguity which Israel 
projected at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War. The two-track policy adopted by the 
United States at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War was a deliberate and decisive 
leveraging of dissuasion. 
It is important to understand that the two-track policy approach of the United States 
with Israel during the start of the Persian Gulf War was not a form of deterrence. In fact, the 
two-track policy approach did not fulfill the attributes required of deterrence for one 
fundamental reason: the United States did not make an explicit threat to retaliate with hard 
power against Iraq should it attack Israel with chemical weapons. As mentioned in the previous 
section of this thesis chapter, threat of punishment is the approach most strongly associated 
with deterrence, and involves nonmilitary (economic) and military action.101  
Though there was an explicit threat offered from Israel against Iraq, there was no 
explicit     threat from the United States against Iraq. The lack of an explicit hard power threat 
from the United States against Iraq is a fundamental underpinning as to why the two-pronged 
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American approach at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War was not an example of American 
deterrence. The United States strategically leaned on Israel as a pawn to deter Iraq, and the 
leveraging of Israeli deterrence was in fact dissuasion by the United States. The “endorsement” 
of the United States supporting Israel responding to an Iraqi chemical attack with 
nonconventional weapons (possibly nuclear) was merely an act which was diplomatic in nature. 
There was no threat from the United States. Moreover, American support of Israel to use 
nonconventional weapons was not an act of deterrence by the United States itself. Rather, US 
support of Israel using “nonconventional weapons” was tactic of dissuasion, diplomatic in 




History has supported the assertion that dissuasion is a tactic which has been used in 
American policy. History has also supported the assertion that dissuasion and deterrence share 
differences in policy, just as the two terms differ in definition. As explained in the literature 
review, “the word ‘de-terrence’ in English consists of two parts that go back to (at least) ancient 
Latin. The ‘de’-prefix in ‘de’-terrence – similarly to so many other common verbs like deflect, 
depart, detach, derail, deviate, defend etc. – connotes ‘away from’.”102 Moreover, “The ‘-
terrence’ part will for most people (accurately) trigger associations with the word ‘terror’, which 
derives from the Latin verb terrere ‘fill with fear, frighten’.”103 The origins and background of 
the term “deterrence” illuminate how the term “dissuasion” is inherently different in definition, 
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and guided this research into exemplifying that dissuasion and deterrence are also different in 
practice. Compelling examples comprising this research provide evidence that dissuasion has 
indeed been used in American policy through utilizing the contrasting definition of deterrence 
against dissuasion as a baseline. 
By definition, deterrence-motivated refrainment from a desired action is rooted in an 
underlying or overt threat should the action be pursued. Dissuasion, as a separate tactic, refers to 
guiding someone into doing something out of their own volition.104 Volition, would be acting out 
of will without threat from the party implementing dissuasion. The decision of taking a specific 
course of action out will of is a critical distinction when compared to taking a specific course of 
action out of fear of an explicit threat. 
The example of the United States leveraging the TRA with Taiwan to mitigate the 
likelihood of a mainland China attack against Taiwan is an example of dissuasion. Using the 
TRA as a tool of dissuasion guides China into acting out of its own volition in refraining from 
attacking Taiwan, but not out of explicitly being strong-armed due to a hard power threat from 
the United States. Leveraging the TRA yields no consideration of an explicit or overt threat 
from  the United States against mainland China should there be an attack against Taiwan. So, it 
can be gathered that strategic ambiguity being injected in the relationship between Taiwan and 
China was a tactic of dissuasion by America. Of course, as this paper outlines, the TRA is 
diplomatic in nature. So, the U.S. diplomatically leveraging the TRA without ever overtly 
threatening China “checks the box” as a tactic of dissuasion. Recall, diplomacy is an attribute of 
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Similarly, the example of the United States adopting a two-pronged policy approach with 
Israel at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War was also an example of American dissuasion. 
“Endorsing” the use of Israeli nonconventional weapons as a response to a chemical attack from 
Iraq offered credibility to the claim that Israel potentially possessed nuclear weapons. However, 
refraining from explicitly acknowledging that Israel possessed nuclear weapons bolstered the 
strategic ambiguity which the Israeli government has sought to project. 
 The injection of strategic ambiguity in the contentious relationship between Israel and 
Iraq at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War acted as a dissuasive tactic in the same manner 
that    strategic ambiguity did with the TRA. Yes, the United States did indeed lean on a threat of 
deterrence by Israel. However, the United States itself did not threaten hard power deterrence 
against Iraq. Therefore, because there was no explicit threat militaristically or economically 
from    the United States against Iraq, leaning on Israel as a pawn in deterring Iraq from taking an 
unfavorable course of action was indeed an example of American implemented dissuasion. 
 Lastly, and possibly most convincingly, the United States utilized dissuasion against Iran 
with the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA). The difference between the historical instance of the 
JCPOA and those of Taiwan and Israel (as mentioned in this paper), is that the JCPOA was a 
direct dissuasive tactic between the United States and Iran. The JCPOA utilized strategy to 
influence the nature of future military competition, which is an attribute of dissuasion. 
Additionally, the Iran Nuclear Deal administered targeted policy which prompted Iran to 
refrain from initiating future military conflict through Iranian volition. And, of course, the 
JCPOA was also diplomatic in nature. All components considered, the JCPOA also “checks 




the box” to be viewed as a tactic of dissuasion implemented in American policy. 
All in all, this chapter has aimed to highlight several historical examples of where 
dissuasion has been used in American policy. It is critical to understand that dissuasion is a 
tactic which has either been confused with deterrence in American policy, or used and not 
acknowledged adequately. This research addresses the question of: “so what?”. It is imperative 
for scholars and    policy practitioners to make the distinction between deterrence and dissuasion, 
because an understanding of the differentiation between the two concepts will yield stronger 
American policy, and enhance American security. 
This paper has articulately, pragmatically, and methodically exemplified how 
dissuasion has been used historically in American policy. Moving forward, based on history, 
this paper believes it can be anticipated that dissuasion will be used again in American policy. 
If the United States intends to keep pace in the new great power competition with adversaries, 
there ought to be a clear understanding of dissuasion across the board so that sound policy can 
be crafted to meet the needs of the future. It is the hope of this paper that sound policy will be 
a byproduct of a   deepened understanding of the distinctions between deterrence, dissuasion, 




 Chapter one of this thesis highlighted the fundamental differences between dissuasion 
and deterrence. Comprehensively, the initial chapter of this thesis established that dissuasion, 




in itself, is a unique concept and tactic within the practice of policy making. Establishing that 
dissuasion is indeed a tool which is wielded within policy creation uniquely, the first chapter 
of this research illuminated a historically ever-present “hole” which has posed an obstacle to 
scholars and policymakers alike. Illuminating and defining the parameters of what constitutes 
dissuasion allowed for this research to highlight examples of where dissuasion has been used 
historically. 
 Chapter two of this thesis used the established parameters of dissuasion to point out 
moments in history where dissuasion was used, and at several points, where dissuasion was 
inaccurately categorized as deterrence. Notably, the most compelling instance of dissuasion 
which was discussed in the preceding chapter of this thesis was the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal 
(JCPOA). As mentioned in chapter two, it is clear that the Iran nuclear deal was not a tactic of 
deterrence. Deterrence, explained during a hearing with the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services (SASC), is a basic equation: deny the aim of an adversary, or convince the adversary 
that the cost of pursuing an objective is too great. The Iran nuclear deal did not convince Iran 
that the cost of pursuing a nuclear bomb was too great.105 On the contrary, the Iran Nuclear 
Deal utilized strategy to influence the nature of future military competition. 
 The United States pursued and enacted a deal with Iran that, according to the Obama 
Administration, mitigated the likelihood of military competition oriented around a landscape that 
was comprised of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon. The United States, through the 
implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, wielded dissuasion. Also as was highlighted in the 
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preceding chapter of this thesis, the dissuasive JCPOA deal leveraged under the Obama 
administration was strikingly different than the approach adopted by the Trump administration.  
 The approach of interacting with Iran which was adopted by the Trump Administration 
was deterrence-oriented. For example, President Donald Trump undertook a maximum economic 
pressure campaign of sanctioning the Iranian regime, assassinated Iranian General Soleimani, 
and ultimately withdrew from the dissuasive Iranian nuclear deal of the Obama administration106. 
Moreover, President Trump proved with his rhetoric that hard power deterrence was his ideal 
choice of response to a threatening Iranian government. In January of 2020, President Trump 
leveraged deterrence-oriented rhetoric from the Oval Office by saying, “let this serve as a 
warning that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites 
that will be hit very fast and very hard. The USA wants no more threats”107. 
 If dissuasion were indeed the same as deterrence, the JCPOA would have been a strongly 
considered avenue for the Trump Administration to pursue. It is critical to recognize that the 
United States has used both deterrence and dissuasion against Iran in the two previous 
Presidential administrations, because the utilization of both tactics highlights that dissuasion and 
deterrence can indeed be wielded by the United States. Moreover, it is critical to this third 
chapter of this thesis to recognize that the dissuasive 2015 JCPOA was done under an 
administration that consisted of Joe Biden as Vice President. 
 Contemporarily, the White House is now occupied by the Biden Administration. This 
third thesis chapter is going to outline the anticipated approach of the Biden Administration to 
interacting with Iran. Specifically, this third chapter is going to flesh out how this research 
expects the Biden Administration to attempt the creation of a new nuclear deal between the 
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United States and Iran. It is important to note that that there is an anticipation by this research to 
see the 2015 JCPOA used as a baseline for a future deal between the United States and Iran. Of 
course, since the 2015 JCPOA is expected to be used as a baseline, a new nuclear deal which is 
created under the Biden Administration is expected to be a tactic of dissuasion. This chapter will 
outline how the Biden Administration will potentially go about pursuing a new nuclear deal. 
Therefore, prior to outlining the anticipated attempt to create a new nuclear deal between the 
United States and Iran, it is imperative that this chapter provides a literature review to bring 
readers up to speed on the pertinent facets of the 2015 JCPOA. 
 
Literature Review 
Schools of Thought: 
 When put into motion, “the 2015 Iran nuclear deal was not without its detractors. The 
Iranian Conservative Party, the US Republican Party and Israel disapproved”108. Additionally, 
“the 15-year implementation process of the deal was likely to be affected by the state-centric 
Constitution of Iran, which left no room for foreign and, in particular, Western considerations, 
and US Republicans feared for the security of the state of Israel.”109 Concerns also stemmed 
beyond the previously mentioned groups. “Other objections came from Arab Sunni States as well 
as US Democrats also concerned about Israeli security”.110 
 While the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed to in Vienna on 14 July 2015 
between the E3+3 and P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran, was considered by many as the 
crowning achievement of a 12-year process of diplomatic negotiation, there was serious concern 
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that the agreement would not adequately or safely resolve the international security crisis posed 
by the clandestine and unidentified nature of the Iranian nuclear activities first noticed in 
2003111. The objective of the E3+3 and P5+1 deal was to ensure that the Iranian nuclear program 
was developed for civilian and non-military purposes by asking Iran to cease its uranium and 
plutonium enrichment, and to authorize inspections and checks carried out by nuclear experts 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on nuclear sites112. Additionally, the E3+3 
and P5+1 deal maintained an arms embargo in order to prevent the spread of offensive weapons 
and the transfer of ballistic missiles to Iran; duties were accompanied by incentives113. 
 Detractors of the deal, as mentioned earlier in this literature review, reproached the 
negotiating team for conceding too much in order to safeguard the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) at all costs before the end of political mandates114. Additionally, criticism was drawn 
regarding sunset provisions, Iranian support for terrorism, and the future of Iranian ballistic 
missile programs in a way that did not rely on economic sanctions or militaristic punishment. 
Brian Rathbun explains that “while some restrictions in the deal would have expired or ‘sunset’ 
at different points and would have needed to be addressed in the future, other restrictions lasted 
more than a decade, and some lasted forever”115. Specifically, it was the sunset restrictions that 
garnered stark opposition. 
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 Dissuasion, as articulated by Batoh, “refers not to what is to be achieved but to how – the 
means that are employed to get there”. Therefore, according to Batoh, there must be two 
conceivable options with this distinction. Simply, one of those options involves positive 
incentives (carrots), the other relies on disincentives (sticks)116. Chapter two of this thesis 
explains that dissuasion ought to be viewed as “carrots” and deterrence ought to be viewed as 
“sticks”; both of which can promote or repel courses of action by another nation state. 
 Bearing in mind the essence and composition of “dissuasion”, it is imperative that the 
dissuasive nature of the 2015 JCPOA is understood by the reader of this chapter. The objective 
of the Iran nuclear deal, according to President Barack Obama, was to “cut off every single one 
of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear program, a nuclear weapons program”117. The goal of the deal, at 
its core, was to preserve American and international security by obstructing the procurement of a 
nuclear bomb by an unpredictable and dangerous state (Iran).  
 It is clear that the Iran nuclear deal was not a tactic of deterrence. Deterrence, as 
previously mentioned, is a basic equation: deny the aim of an adversary, or convince the 
adversary that the cost of pursuing an objective is too great118. On the contrary, in tandem with 
the 2001 QDR, the JCPOA aimed to utilize strategy and actions to influence the threat of Iran in 
a certain direction by complicating military planning with well-targeted strategy and policy. The 
2015 JCPOA aimed to dissuade Iran from initiating future military competitions119. Moreover, it 
is important to understand that the Iran Nuclear Deal was a tactic of dissuasion when the tactic of 
deterrence was still a viable option. The understanding of how dissuasion was a deliberately 
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chosen tactic when deterrence was a viable option is vital in differentiating the two phenomenas 
and accurately classifying the JCPOA as dissuasive. 
 The Iran Nuclear Deal was diplomatic in nature which is not an attribute of deterrence, 
but is indeed an attribute of dissuasion. Brian Rathbun explains that “if those in a position of 
leverage always adopt coercive bargaining, then diplomacy matters little. Moreover, if the strong 
always get their way, diplomacy is not important”120. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) was not deterrence because the deal did not rely on coercion. And, notably, the primary 
party of strength, the United States, did not entirely get its way either. And, as mentioned in the 
preceding chapter of this thesis, the JCPOA utilized strategy rooted in diplomacy to influence the 
nature of future military competition, and targeted policy which dissuaded Iran from initiating 
potential future military conflict by having a nuclear weapon. 
 
Conclusion: 
 Compellingly, a thorough review of literature regarding the 2015 JCPOA yields the 
determination that the JCPOA was a tactic of dissuasion. Moreover, a thorough review of 
literature regarding the 2015 JCPOA yields the determination that there were substantial 
deficiencies with the final product which was churned out under the Obama Administration. 
Contemporarily, “Biden has outlined his commitment to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear 
weapons and to return the United States to the JCPOA if Iran fulfills its obligations, as outlined 
in the agreement”121. Therefore, it can be anticipated President Joe Biden in will also pursue a 
dissuasive deal with Iran, just as Barack Obama did in 2015. 
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 Though there is reason to believe President Joe Biden will pursue another dissuasive deal 
with Iran, this research anticipates that President Biden will work to create a deal which parallels 
that of the 2015 JCPOA, while also addressing deficiencies and downfalls of the 2015 JCPOA 
which were highlighted in this literature review. There is evidence to expect “continued 
negotiations – together with European partners – to extend the limits stipulated in the original 
deal, and address regional tensions in a revised agreement”122. Specifically, this research 
anticipates the Biden administration to address particular facets of the 2015 JCPOA highlighted 
by former Special Advisor for the State Department’s Iran Action Group, Gabriel Noronha. 
 Noronha explains that the exit and strategy of the United States withdrawing from the 
Iran Nuclear Deal in May of 2018 was geared towards depriving the Iranian regime of revenue 
used to conduct activity. Specifically, the deprivation of revenue since the withdraw of the 
United States from the JCPOA can be assessed as a segue into guiding Iran back to the 
negotiating table for a better deal123. According to Noronha, “U.S. sanctions deprived the Iranian 
regime of more than $70 billion dollars that forced it to cut payments to Hamas and Hezbollah, 
shutter multiple propaganda channels, and cut this year’s proposed military budget by 24%”124. 
Now, the United States has the opportunity to clinch a new dissuasive deal that satisfies ills of 
the 2015 JCPOA detractors. The subsequent portions of this thesis chapter will outline how 
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exactly the Biden Administration aims to clinch a dissuasive deal which remedies the ailments 
highlighted by detractors of the 2015 JCPOA. 
 
Presentation and Discussion: 
New Nuclear Deal - What shouldn’t it look like? 
 Explicitly, former Special Advisor for the State Department’s Iran Action Group, Gabriel 
Noronha, explains that a new deal which is pursued with Iran should not look like the JCPOA in 
specific regards. This research, of course, concurs with Noronha. Particularly, Noronha 
highlights that a return to the JCPOA is Iran’s ardent hope, but indulging the regime and 
discarding American leverage would be a historic blunder125. In fact, Noronha specifically 
touches on the sunset provisions mentioned in the literature review of this chapter.  
 The JCPOA’s sunset clauses, as stated by Noronha on unrestricted nuclear activity, are 
now more than five years closer to expiration. Iran has built the largest ballistic missile force in 
the Middle East, but the JCPOA imposed no real restrictions on those armaments126. Moreover, 
according to Noronha, the deal also did not do anything to erode Iran’s support for terrorism or 
halt its hostage-taking127. The lack of attention toward combating Iranian support of terrorism is 
one of the major concerns of detractors of the JCPOA.  
 A new deal under the Biden Administration, based on the findings of this research, will 
steer clear of any form which offers the appearance of disregarding the security of Israel. In fact, 









with Israel and has already proven to be its great ally”128. For example, according to Hatuel-
Radoshitzky, “campaign pledges indicate that Biden will remain committed to preserve Israel's 
qualitative military edge (QME), will not condition continued defense assistance on a change in 
Israeli policy, and will not move the US Embassy from its Jerusalem site.”129  
 The JCPOA established under the Obama administration did not consist of addressing US 
Republicans fears for the security of the state of Israel. Additionally, the 2015 JCPOA did not 
remedy other objections from Arab Sunni States as well as US Democrats also concerned about 
Israeli security”130. Noronha alluded to the disregard for Israeli security in the 2015 JCPOA by 
encouraging the Biden Administration to listen when Israel and Arab nations speak with one 
voice against reentering the original JCPOA131. The “one voice” referenced by Noronha refers to 
the security and safety (or lack thereof) of Israel under the JCPOA. This research finds that a 
Biden Administration will listen to the “one voice” of Israel and Arab nations against reentering 
the original JCPOA without a revised approach. That being said, a new deal in itself will indeed 
remain a tactic of dissuasion. 
 
 
New Nuclear Deal - What should it look like? 
 The Biden Administration, based on the contemporary environment of international 
affairs and American politics, will likely aim to pursue a deal with Iran that acts more as a means 
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to an end, not an end in itself132. The approach of pursuing a deal which is a means to an end, as 
opposed to an end in itself, is critical to this research for several reasons. In accordance with 
Noronha, this research finds that the Biden Administration will find it critical for a new deal to 
address the full range of Iran’s behavior, not merely place modest and temporary restrictions on 
Iran’s nuclear program and hope Iran is willing to negotiate further. Negotiations will likely be 
conducted from a position of strength. Which, due to pressure from economic sanctions by the 
previous Trump administration133, has been established.  
 The position of strength which has been cultivated by the economic sanctions of the 
Trump Administration yields an opportunity for the Biden Administration to negotiate from a 
standpoint which was not utilized under the Obama Administration during the crafting of the 
original JCPOA. Therefore, it can be anticipated that a strong negotiating approach will be 
undertaken by the Biden Administration. And, subsequently, a new nuclear deal will reflect that 
revised approach. A new deal shouldn’t be negotiated from a position of weakness, and this 
research anticipates the Biden Administration will follow that credo. 
 Considering the anticipation of a deal which is pursued from a position of strength, there 
is reason to believe that a bipartisan product can be expected. Notably, when recognizing the tied 
Senate President Biden is operating with in the United States Senate amid the first session of the 
117th congress, there is legitimate reason to expect a deal which acknowledges bipartisan 
concerns. In fact, in order for a new deal to withstand a Senate requiring a Vice Presidential tie-
breaking vote, the Biden Administration will likely aim to find a common ground which 
Congress at-large can tolerate.  
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 According to Hatuel-Radoshitzky, election results (particularly with a tied senate) “may 
force Biden to cooperate with moderate Republicans – against the will of the progressive 
Democratic wing – in order to promote legislative initiatives such as a new nuclear deal with 
Iran”134. This research expects the Biden Administration will achieve a bipartisan product by 
addressing the key points outlined in the previous paragraphs of the presentation and discussion 
portion of this thesis. Notably, achieving a bipartisan product is an important distinction from the 
2015 JCPOA, which did not garner at-large congressional support. 
 According to Noronha, “congressional support is critical to the success of any 
arrangement such as a new nuclear deal with Iran. And, though it never came to fruition, the 
Trump Administration did repeatedly pledge to establish a deal which possessed congressional 
support”135. Therefore, it can be further understood that the current landscape between the United 
States and Iran is conducive for a new deal to be embarked upon. And, if successful, the Biden 
Administration can claim it followed through on the failed promise of the Trump Administration 
to craft a deal which enjoys congressional support. And, again, based on the stances taken during 
the Biden Presidential campaign, it is anticipated that the Biden Administration will aim to 
achieve this goal while paralleling the successful components of the 2015 JCPOA. That being 
said, this research expects attempted remedy of the concerns of 2015 JCPOA detractors as a 
byproduct of a tied Senate.  
 Kelsey Davenport, with the Arms Control Association, explains that “under the 2015 Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), the president must issue a certification to Congress 
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every 90 days that is tied to Iran’s performance under the multilateral nuclear deal known as the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Failure to issue the certification gives Congress 
the option to introduce legislation reimposing U.S. sanctions waived or suspended under the 
JCPOA on an expedited schedule”136. It is critical to recognize that the legal requirement of 
garnering congressional support for a new deal with Iran stems from a law which was signed into 
action by former President Barack Obama while Joe Biden resided as Vice President.  
 According to Noronha, “the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, signed into law by 
former President Barack Obama in 2015, requires any ‘agreement,’ regardless of the form it 
takes, to be submitted to Congress for review. The law also specifies this requirement applies to 
‘any related agreements … whether entered into or implemented in the future,’ relevant to the 
scenario we face today”137. Simply, it ought to be legally expected that “any agreement, or 
attempt to return to the JCPOA, that circumvents Congress would be both unlawful and doomed 
to fail yet again”138. Should the Biden Administration aim to pursue a new nuclear deal with Iran, 
it can be anticipated that the INARA will be a guiding benchmark. Therefore, any legally 
obtained agreement will reflect satisfied concerns of detractors of the original JCPOA. And, of 
course, the deal as a whole will still be a tactic of dissuasion on behalf of the United States. 
 
New Nuclear Deal - Why Iran should agree? 
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 There is also incentive on the part of Iran to see a bipartisan deal reached within the 
American political system. According to Noronha, “if President Biden attempted to pursue a deal 
which did not receive congressional support, Republicans, including those who might ascend to 
the Oval Office in 2024, will justifiably warn Iran they will not honor the same deal former 
President Donald Trump withdrew from139. If exercising prudent and pragmatic foresight, Iran's 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will also come to this realization. Should this proposed 
realization by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei come to fruition, he will likely understand the economic 
ramifications or benefits should a sustainable new nuclear deal be reached or unsuccessful. 
 Economically, international businesses are likely to understand the consequences of a 
Republican eventually ascending to the Oval Office and ultimately withdrawing from a deal 
which was established by the Biden Administration140. Inversely, international businesses are 
also likely to understand and recognize the benefits of deal established under the Biden 
Administration which enjoys congressional support and is sustainable. Wisely, Noronha explains 
that it would be advantageous to the “Iranian regime to ensure bipartisan agreement for any deal 
it strikes, rather than mollifying just one political party”141. This, in itself, is a compelling reason 
for Iran to seek a new nuclear deal with the United States. And, this is a compelling reason to 
anticipate the Biden Administration to pursue a new dissuasive nuclear deal with Iran. 
 Advantages which can be associated with a prudent, calculated, and congressionally 
supported deal are substantial. For example, according to Noronha, “critics, supporters, and 
foreign governments party to the agreement will all know the new deal is binding. Therefore, 
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future administrations will find it more difficult to withdraw from the new deal”142. Additionally, 
“bipartisan support for such a deal, with restrictions that will not expire, will decrease the 
chances that the ayatollahs violate it”143. Noronha even suggests a treaty to accomplish this task. 
 Additional benefits of a bipartisan legally binding nuclear deal will include giving 
international businesses clarity on long term investment decisions with Iran144. The Biden 
Administration and the Iranian Supreme Leader ought to see this, and approach a new deal 
accordingly. Long term investments from the international business community will boost 
economic prosperity of Iran as a whole, subsequently benefitting the Iranian people. There is 
compelling evidence to expect Iran being prone to engage in negotiations for a new nuclear deal. 
Likewise, the compelling evidence of Iran engaging in a deal will likely be noted by the Biden 
Administration, and play a role in pushing the President and his advisors to propose the initiative 




New Nuclear Deal - How should it happen? 
 Optimistically, there is a path forward for the Biden administration to create such an 
arrangement with the “legs” to go the distance. Simply, the Biden Administration may pledge to 
bring any deal to the Senate for approval145. Should this happen, the tied Senate will allow 
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Republicans the leverage to ensure that a tolerable binding deal is obtained. And, of course, with 
the intention of crafting a sustainable deal bearing congressional support, the Biden 
Administration will adopt Republican concerns during careful formulation to avoid a historic 
blunder.  
 Anticipated by this research, the Biden Administration will consult with Republicans in 
the Senate which possess concern regarding sunset provisions in the former JCPOA. 
Additionally, there will be dialogue between the Executive Branch and members of both sides of 
the political aisle about ensuring Israeli security under the creation of a new deal. As is stated 
earlier in this chapter, Israeli security was a concern of both Republicans and Democrats with the 
2015 JCPOA. Therefore, in order to garner Congressional support in accordance with the 
INARA, the Biden Administration will include language within a new nuclear deal which 
satisfies both Republican and Democrat safety concerns for Israel. 
 Moreover, should the Biden Administration indeed pursue a new nuclear deal with Iran, 
there will be a substantial consideration of the implementation process of a new deal. 
Particularly, this research anticipates that the Biden Administration will aim to mitigate influence 
of the state-centric Constitution of Iran. As stated earlier in this paper, the 15-year 
implementation process of the 2015 JCPOA was likely to be affected by the state-centric 
Constitution of Iran. A concerted effort to craft a sustainable congressionally supported new 
nuclear deal by the Biden Administration will likely attempt and avoid the influence of the state-
centric Constitution of Iran. Specifically, a leaning on an implementation process which 
leverages concerns of detractors of the 2015 JCPOA in Congress will likely satisfy that concern. 
 
Will a new deal be a tactic of dissuasion? 




 As previously articled, there is credible reason to view the 2015 JCPOA as a tactic of 
dissuasion which was implemented by the United States.  Hatuel-Radoshitzky articulates that 
“attempts to anticipate policies and conduct of the incoming Biden administration should factor 
in the Party’s embrace of multilateralism and the use of diplomatic tools as a means of boosting 
US soft power in the international arena. In this context, the Biden administration, in contrast to 
its predecessor, can be expected to step up global cooperation”146. And, should the Biden 
Administration use the 2015 JCPOA as a baseline, this research finds that a new deal will also be 
dissuasive based on the diplomatic nature of global cooperation.  
 “After the presidential elections of 14 June 2013, Iran’s Hassan Rouhani proved that he 
was introducing changes in the country’s foreign policy based on cooperation and moderation as 
he did when he was nuclear negotiator. The outlook of Rouhani, therefore, created opportunities 
and opened the door for a rapprochement between Iran and the West.”147 The objective of the 
JCPOA, according to President Barack Obama, was to “cut off every single one of Iran’s 
pathways to a nuclear program, a nuclear weapons program”148. The objective of the deal, at its 
core, was to preserve American and international security by obstructing the procurement of a 
nuclear bomb by an unpredictable and dangerous state (Iran). 
 As was also explained in the second chapter of this thesis, the JCPOA did not satisfy the 
definition of deterrence provided at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services: deny 
the aim of an adversary, or convince the adversary that the cost of pursuing an objective is too 
great149. The JCPOA did not convince Iran that the cost of pursuing a nuclear bomb was too 
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great. On the contrary, the original Iran nuclear deal utilized strategy to influence the nature of 
future military competition. Specifically, the United States pursued and enacted a deal with Iran 
that, according to the Obama Administration, mitigated the likelihood of military competition 
oriented around a landscape that was comprised of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon. The United 
States, through the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, wielded dissuasion. 
 It is expected by this research that a new deal which is pursued under the Biden 
Administration will also aim to utilize strategy rooted in diplomacy to influence the nature of 
future military competition, and target policy which will dissuade Iran from initiating potential 
future military conflict by having a nuclear weapon. Therefore, it is expected that a new deal 
under the Biden Administration will also be dissuasive in nature; just as the predeceasing deal 
under the Obama Administration was. Moreover, just as Iran’s Hassan Rouhani proved that he 
was introducing changes in the country’s foreign policy based on cooperation and moderation as 
he did when he was nuclear negotiator in 2013, there is reason to expect a suitable climate also 
currently exists for the Biden Administration to move forward with a negotiable Iran toward a 
new deal. 
 Contemporarily, Iran is prepared to return to the negotiating table for a new deal. Of 
course, the scenario Iran finds itself in currently is not by any means the same as what it 
experienced following the presidential elections in June of 2013. Due to substantial economic 
pressure through sanctions implemented by the previous Trump administration, the Iranian 
regime, according to United States CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie, has been 
leveraged into a position where their only real option to retaliate is by attacking. Considering that 
the only form of retaliation against American deterrence is attacking, there is reason to believe 
that Iran will want to re-approach the negotiating table to cultivate a more sustainable solution 




which benefits Iran. Should “push come to shove”, the United States is significantly the more 
capable nation state should armed conflict be the ultimate resolution between the US and Iran.  
 Though the current relationship between the US and Iran is an entirely different dynamic 
when compared to 2013, this research finds that Iran will indeed want to reengage with 
discussion to craft a new nuclear deal to avoid “attack” on the United States as the sole tool at 
their disposal. Should this occur, this research expects a new deal to be a tactic of dissuasion, just 
as the 2015 was a tactic of dissuasion. The climate, landscape, and status of relations between the 
United States and Iran is conducive for both parties to aim for a new revitalized dissuasive deal. 
 
Conclusion: 
 “The president’s role, in principle, is to execute the laws enacted by Congress. Nowhere 
does the Constitution suggest that the president is expected to take a lead role in lawmaking.”150 
Therefore, it can be gathered that any major deal which is struck between the United States and 
Iran will consist of substantial Congressional support. That being said, “many presidents have 
taken a broad view of their responsibilities, and, since the 1930s and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
New Deal, every president has proposed packages of programs and policies to the Congress. 
Like his predecessors, upon assuming office in January 2017, President Trump presented 
Congress with a package of priorities and proposals.”151 
 There is precedent and framework for the Biden Administration to undertake the 
ambitious initiative of creating a new dissuasive nuclear deal with Iran. For example, “though 
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enacted by Congress, arguably the two most important sets of government programs introduced 
during the past century - Franklin D. Roosevelts’ New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society 
- were developed by these two presidents and their advisers, albeit with some modifications 
made by Congress”152. Bearing in mind that Roosevelts’ New Deal and Johnson’s Great Society 
were developed by both Presidents and their advisors, it is reasonable to anticipate the same from 
the Biden Administration in constructing a new nuclear deal with Iran. The environment and 
precedent of the Executive Branch spearheading a new deal is ripe for the anticipations of a new 
deal outlined in this chapter to come to fruition. 
 More importantly to this research as a whole, it is pragmatic to anticipate any new 
nuclear deal which the Biden Administration attempts to create with Iran will be dissuasive in 
nature. Should the Biden Administration pursue a new nuclear deal as outlined by this research, 
the understanding of dissuasion as a tactic and concept in its own right will allow for 
policymakers, academics, and scholars to begin to close the “hole” in American defense policy 
planning which was created when the National Defense Strategy (NDS) replaced the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as the capstone of strategic guidance to the United States 
Department of Defense (outlined in the first chapter of this thesis). 
 As stated in the first chapter of this thesis, the pivot from the QDR to the NDS has 
undercut the consideration of dissuasion as a tactic within international defense policy, and left 
US policymakers yearning for clarification regarding how to approach contemporary dilemmas 
or policy initiatives within the international arena. The current status of relations between the 
United States and Iran is a pristine exemplar of where policymakers have struggled with 
approaching and addressing a contemporary dilemma. Recall, United States CENTCOM 
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Commander General McKenzie, testified that Iran has been leveraged into a position where the 
only tool at their disposal, to combat the United States, is attacking. 
 Considering that the approach of the Trump Administration was deterrence oriented, it 
can be gathered that deterrence has essentially failed in terms of reigning in the Iranian regime; 
nonetheless cultivating a sustainable resolution for the toxic relationship between Iran and the 
United States. Moreover, due to the JCPOA not being appropriately considered as a tactic of 
dissuasion when implemented by the Obama administration, the byproduct was a deal which left 
Congress unsatisfied. Naturally, the JCPOA failed and was withdrawn from by President Trump. 
The lack of congressional support for the JCPOA can be attributed to a lack of understanding of 
what the JCPOA truly was. Was the JCPOA a tactic of deterrence? Was the JCPOA a pure tactic 
of diplomacy? The aforementioned questions remained unanswered due to the inadequate 
labeling of the JCPOA not as a tactic of dissuasion. Now, due to this research, the JCPOA can be 
highlighted and understood as a tactic of dissuasion. 
 Dissuasion is a concept which has been severely neglected as the international landscape 
shifts with time. Now, should policymakers understand and view dissuasion as a tactic and 
concept in itself, there can be an expectation for the threshold which ought to be met by new 
initiatives that are undertaken with the objectives of dissuasion in mind. A new nuclear deal with 
Iran which parallels the JCPOA is a contemporary dilemma and potential future initiative which 
can be pursued within the parameters of dissuasion in mind. And, if successful, can aid in the 
establishing of expectations for the threshold of success of dissuasion-oriented initiatives. 
 The expectation is simple, and aligns with the definition of dissuasion which was outlined 
in the QDR prior to the implementation of NDS. Simply, a new nuclear deal with Iran must 
dissuade Iran from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those 




of US allies. “Dissuading” Iran from undertaking such aforementioned programs will consist of 
an approach which is diplomatic in nature, and utilizes strategy and actions to influence the 
nature of future military competition with Iran, and channels their threats in a manner which 
complicates their military planning against the United States153. 
 All in all, it is the intention of this chapter to take the definition and parameters of 
dissuasion which have been outlined previously in this research, and apply them to a future 
scenario which will very likely come to fruition. As stated in chapter two of this thesis, and as is 
true with this third chapter, this research addresses the question of: “so what?” and “what does 
outlining an anticipated new dissuasive nuclear deal with Iran contribute to this field of study?”. 
It is imperative for scholars and policy practitioners to make the distinction between deterrence 
and dissuasion, because an understanding of greater depth between the two concepts will yield 
stronger American policy, and enhance American security. 
 This research exemplifies how a greater understanding of the distinction between 
deterrence and dissuasion, by meticulously outlining what logistical facets of a new dissuasive 
nuclear deal between the United States and Iran will look like, will contribute to preserving 
American security. This third chapter serves as an exemplar of how utilizing a deeper 
understanding of dissuasion can be applied to a contemporary contentious relationship 
experienced by the United States. And, of course, how American security can subsequently be 
enhanced by crafting a new nuclear deal with Iran which does not simply rely on rendering Iran 
only capable of responding with an attack.  
 This third chapter solidifies that dissuasion is indeed a concept of its own through the 
anticipation and outlining of its use by the Biden Administration with a new nuclear deal with 
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Iran. Though this chapter is not providing a novel example of dissuasion because it is 
expected that a new nuclear deal under Biden will parallel the dissuasive JCPOA, this chapter 
does highlight that a new deal can be expected to be attempted by the Biden team. And, if 
attempted, a new deal can be properly viewed as a tactic of dissuasion for future use of 
scholars and policy practitioners. The appropriate viewing of a new nuclear deal as a tactic of 
dissuasion will provide policy practitioners with insight of what is to be expected of future 
dissuasive initiatives. And, in accordance with the “so what” of this research, yield stronger 









Comprehensively, the three substantive chapters comprising this thesis have reinforced 
the conclusion that dissuasion is in fact a tactic in itself. And, if policy creation by the United 
States in the future is to be properly crafted, policymakers ought to not only understand 
dissuasion by its defining qualities and parameters, but also anticipate where dissuasion may be 
used in the future. Chapter one highlights that dissuasion utilizes targeted strategy and policy to 
complicate planning of another nation state, and can be used by any state regardless of deterrence 
capabilities. Chapter two explains that dissuasion is diplomatic in nature, and guides other nation 




states into acting out of their own volition. Moreover, chapters one and two together underscore 
that dissuasion channels threats in certain directions, complicates planning for adversaries, and 
refrains from the use of explicit hard power tactics such as economic and militaristic threat. 
Chapter three, leaning on the findings of chapters one and two, outlined how dissuasion can be 
anticipated to be used in future American policy through the prediction of the creation of a new 
nuclear deal with Iran. 
 In order to adequately begin introducing dissuasion theory to the policy world, this 
conclusion recommends dissuasion begin being discussed in the institutional processes of 
Congress. Specifically, the premier place to begin is in congressional hearings in the United 
States Senate. The United States Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC) is the optimal 
committee to begin implementing adequately understood dissuasion into policy creation. There is 
a compelling institutional window of opportunity to start learning more about dissuasion through 
testimony of witnesses in hearings conducted by the SASC. 
 The Senate Committee on Armed Services conducts hearings all throughout the year, and 
calls leading officials from the defense world to testify on a wide array of topics. This research 
proposes that the Senate Committee on Armed Services specifically begin by holding a series of 
hearings on where deterrence has failed in American policy, what dissuasion is from the vantage 
point of key witnesses, and the results of current policy initiatives which closely align with the 
parameters of dissuasion outlined in this research. It is indeed feasible for the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services to conduct such hearings. And, should these respective hearings be 
conducted, the facilitation of production of useful testimony regarding dissuasion can be 
expected. Specifically, should Senators on the committee ask targeted questions regarding 




dissuasion, the testimony which is derived from key witnesses can be used when crafting 
language for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 
 It is important to discuss why the National Defense Authorization Act is the primary 
reason this research finds that the Senate Committee on Armed Services should spearhead the 
push to begin incorporating dissuasion into policy creation. The NDAA is a massive $731.6 
billion piece of legislation which includes provisions for military pay raises, the construction of 
military housing and sweeping improvements to the federal government’s approach to 
cybersecurity, among thousands of other provisions relating to American security154. In fact, in 
January 2021, the Senate voted 81-13 to override President Donald Trump’s veto of the fiscal 
2021 defense authorization bill, marking a rebuke to the outgoing commander in chief that paved 
the way for the annual bill to become law for the 60th straight year.155 Should the FY22 NDAA 
once again successfully pass in 2021, the streak of consecutive passage into law will stretch to 61 
years. As the author of this research, and former staffer with the SASC, my first-hand experience 
has shown me that the NDAA being passed into law is a congressional phenomena. A bill of that 
size, consistently being passed into law, is unique in the contemporary American Congress. 
Partisanship often cripples the congressional initiatives in modern day, but the NDAA continues 
to enjoy safe passage. 
 Considering the legacy of the National Defense Authorization Act over the last 60 years, 
the ability to continuously pass this bill yields great influence and power to the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services. Should a policy initiative be included in the final product of 
NDAA before departing the Senate, there is a 60-year precedent to expect that initiative will 
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ultimately become law. As a testament to the reputation of the NDAA, there are often many 
miscellaneous policy initiatives which are attempted to be attached to the bill. As often happens 
with bills likely to be passed into law, the objective of miscellaneous attachments stem from 
hope that those respective attachments will be incorporated in the final product. If retained in 
NDAA, those attachments are almost guaranteed to become law. 
 The miscellaneous policy initiatives for which attempts are made to attach to the NDAA, 
particularly at the tail-end of the bill cycle, are often unrelated to SASC jurisdiction. Therefore, 
when unrelated policy initiatives are attached or attempted to be attached to the bill, the bill 
becomes an omnibus. According to Krutz, “omnibus legislating is a standard part of the 
congressional landscape altering traditional lawmaking in important ways, and omnibus bills are 
almost always enacted into law”.156 Dissuasion, and dissuasion-oriented policy, in comparison to 
frivolous unrelated attachments to the bill (which often get dropped), are distinctly different. On 
the contrary, based on the findings of this research, dissuasion-related policy is not only a 
relative and pertinent concern when crafting language for defense policy, but is also pivotal to 
preserving American national security. 
 For example, chapter one of this thesis explained that the transition from the Quadrennial 
Defense Review to the National Defense Strategy as the cornerstone guidance for the 
Department of Defense yielded a “hole” in policy creation. The “hole” stemmed from 
undercutting dissuasion as tactic and tool which is used in policy creation. The realization of the 
“hole” in policy creation stemming from the transition from the QDR to the NDS is critical 
because the NDS is often leaned upon by Senators during questioning of witnesses amid hearings 
conducted by the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Notably, former Chairman (now 
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Ranking Member) Senator Jim Inhofe has a prevalent history of leaning on the NDS as a guiding 
document in his line of questioning amid hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. 
For example, as recently as March 2021, Senator Jim Inhofe asked Gen. McMaster, former 
National Security Advisor under President Trump, “what principles and priorities he feels should 
be retained from the 2018 National Defense Strategy”157. 
 It is important to note that Committee staff are hired by and work for the Chairman and 
Ranking Members of the SASC. Considering that Senator Jim Inhofe often leans on the NDS as 
a guiding document for his line of questioning amid committee hearings, there is a notable path 
forward to spotlight the NDS, and how the NDS can be leaned on when questioning witnesses. It 
is recommended by this research that the Senators (ideally the Chairman and Ranking Member) 
of the SASC ask specific questions in a committee hearing relating to the NDS, how witnesses 
may believe dissuasion was undercut following the transition from the QDR, and how future 
initiatives may indeed be a tactic of dissuasion as opposed to deterrence or traditional diplomacy. 
Hearings may serve the function of being exploratory in nature to provide testimony and data 
about topics of current interest.158 Relating to this research, the topic of interest is dissuasion in 
American policy. 
 Questions which are asked by Senators during hearings of the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services yield answers from prominent figures in the world of defense policy and 
national security. Naturally, answers derived from questions which have been asked during 
committee hearings are archived and utilized by committee staff. Committee staff take the 
testimony (answers) from witnesses in committee hearings, and use those respective answers to 
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craft language for the NDAA during the markup and conference portions of the defense 
authorization bill cycle. The markup and conference portions of the NDAA bill cycle are the 
premier institutional window for dissuasion-related policy to begin to be incorporated into policy 
creation. 
 Regarding chapter two, the chapter fleshes how exactly dissuasion has been used by the 
United States historically. Additionally, the second chapter consists of unpacking the JCPOA, 
the Taiwan Relations Act, and bolstered nuclear ambiguity of Israel in relation to dissuasion 
which has been wielded by the United States. Each of the historical exemplars of American-
utilized dissuasion in chapter two set a foundation for questioning which can be utilized by 
Senators amid hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Therefore, Senators can 
begin the process of incorporating dissuasion consideration into policy creation. Of course, this 
conclusion recommends that testimony which is derived from the baseline-originated questions 
be utilized in the crafting of language for the NDAA during the markup and conference portions 
of the defense authorization bill cycle. 
 Chapter two also provides a foundation for Senators to ask questions regarding 
dissuasion, diplomacy, and how the two are intertwined. For example, the second chapter 
explains that the TRA and JCPOA are diplomatic in nature. Additionally, the second chapter also 
highlights that the United States has leveraged a diplomatic relationship with Israel to wield 
dissuasion by bolstering Israeli nuclear ambiguity. The spotlight which is shed on the diplomatic 
attributes of dissuasion in chapter two provide another strong foundation from which Senators 
can derive questions for witnesses in a SASC hearing. 
 The foundation to derive questions for a congressional hearing is imperative. Particularly, 
a strong foundation is critical to begin the process of incorporating adequately understood 




dissuasion into defense bill language through clear testimony from witnesses. The conclusion of 
this research suggests that Senators capitalize on the foundation of understanding the relationship  
between dissuasion and diplomacy. Senators ought to ask targeted questions aimed at 
determining if current policy initiatives are indeed tactics of dissuasion, and if those initiatives 
are diplomatic in nature.     
 Again, should Senators draw useful testimony which spotlights where dissuasion is 
indeed being used by the United States, this research recommends that language be derived from 
that testimony during markup and conference for the NDAA. Bottom line, if key witnesses 
produce information which confirms contemporary policy initiatives as being tactics of 
dissuasion due to diplomatic attributes, and those assertions are captured in congressional 
testimony, there is a clear opportunity for the SASC to begin writing dissuasion-oriented 
language which will be incorporated in the NDAA. 
 Chapter three, in similar fashion to chapters one and two, provides information to 
reinforce the significance of dissuasion in American policy. In fact, chapter three builds off of 
the findings of chapters one and two. The third chapter underscores the relevance of considering 
dissuasion for future American policy initiatives. Chapter three explains that the Biden 
Administration can be anticipated to pursue a new nuclear deal with Iran, and articulates why 
that is a pragmatic anticipation.  
 According to chapter three, the Biden Administration can be expected to pursue a new 
nuclear deal with Iran which parallels the JCPOA in dissuasive nature. Though this research 
anticipates a new deal to be pursed, there is also an expectation that key deficiencies of the 2015 
JCPOA will be addressed. The final chapter of this research solidifies the assertion that the 
JCPOA was a tactic dissuasion, and explains how a paralleled new nuclear deal under the Biden 




Administration is also expected to be a tactic of dissuasion. Ultimately, through the prediction of 
the JCPOA being used as a guidepost for a new nuclear deal with Iran, chapter three spotlights a 
very possible future use of dissuasion in American policy. Clearly, the chapter underscores that 
there is compelling reason to expect dissuasion to be used by the United States in the future by 
outlining a predictive example. 
 While this research successfully establishes dissuasion as a tactic in itself, and provides 
compelling rationale as to why dissuasion is significant to future American policy planning, there 
is still room for more research to be conducted. For example, based on the findings of this thesis, 
there is a need for more research in the area of potential future uses of dissuasion by the United 
States. Additionally, there is a need for more research in the area of potential future uses of 
dissuasion against the United States. This research outlines the likelihood of predicting a new 
dissuasive nuclear deal between Iran and the United States. As a result, that compelling 
prediction reinforces the fact that dissuasion will continue to be a part of American policy 
planning in the future. Further research should expound upon the realization that dissuasion will 
be a part of future American policy initiatives, and explore where dissuasion can be anticipated 
in new capacities and scenarios. 
 This conclusion suggests that further research which compellingly predicts the uses of 
dissuasion (by and against US) will contribute substantially to prudently creating dissuasion-
related policy. The single in-depth predictive example of where dissuasion can be expected to be 
used in the future (offered in chapter three) is one example of many more possible scenarios. 
Should further research be conducted regarding where dissuasion can be anticipated in the future, 
a heightened sense of urgency to incorporate dissuasion consideration into policy will be 
garnered. A heightened sense of urgency to incorporate dissuasion theory into policy planning 




due to its relation to future American security will result in legislation which reflects stronger 
policy. 
 This conclusion also suggests that there be further research regarding the congressional 
institutional process, what other committees can be leveraged as an institutional window to learn 
more about dissuasion, and how dissuasion theory can begin to be incorporated into policy 
creation. Therefore, this thesis recommends future research be conducted regarding the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC), and how dissuasion is intertwined with SFRC 
initiatives. As outlined in chapter two, dissuasion is diplomatic in nature. There is an opportunity 
to learn more about how dissuasion, diplomatically, contributes to the way in which the SFRC 
operates. Should new research be conducted regarding where dissuasion can be implemented 
through institutional windows of congress aside from the NDAA, there can be an expectation of 
a greater ability to include dissuasion into legislation. This research finds that searching for new 
institutional windows of Congress by analyzing the relationship between dissuasion and the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is a natural “next step” to include dissuasion into policy. 
Ideally, just as this research has been conducted, analyzing the relationship between dissuasion 
and the SFRC ought to be done by an individual intimately familiar with the inner-workings of 
the committee. 
 All in all, the three substantive chapters comprising this thesis have reinforced the 
conclusion that dissuasion is indeed a tactic in itself. And, if policy creation by the United States 
in the future is to be comprehensively crafted, policymakers ought to not only understand 
dissuasion by its defining qualities and parameters, but also anticipate where dissuasion may be 
used in the future. This research as a whole explains that dissuasion is diplomatic in nature, and 
guides other nation states into acting out of their own volition. This research also highlights that 




dissuasion utilizes targeted strategy and policy to complicate planning of another nation state, 
and can be used by any state regardless of deterrence capabilities. The three chapters comprising 
this thesis soundly establish those findings. 
 It is imperative for scholars and policy practitioners to make the distinction between 
deterrence and dissuasion because a greater understanding of the differences between the two 
concepts will yield stronger American policy and enhance American security. This research 
facilitates accomplishing the goal of understanding that deterrence relies on fear. This research 
finds that “the word ‘de-terrence’ in English consists of two parts that go back to (at least) 
ancient Latin. The ‘de’-prefix in ‘de’-terrence – similarly to so many other common verbs like 
deflect, depart, detach, derail, deviate, defend etc. – connotes ‘away from’.”159 “The ‘-terrence’ 
part will for most people (accurately) trigger associations with the word ‘terror’, which derives 
from the Latin verb terrere ‘fill with fear, frighten’.”160 Therefore, “those two components – 1) to 
use ‘fear’ to 2) push somebody ‘away from’ a course of action they may want to pursue – do 
indeed appear to be two foundational definitional building blocks that we find back in all 
disciplines in which deterrence is a focus of theoretical and/or practical inquiry”.161  
 This research finds that deterrence has undertaken a theoretical and practical capacity 
in American policy which stretches beyond the use of fear to accomplish a policy objective. 
This finding is problematic because “extending the definition of deterrence beyond its threat-
of-punishment meaning obfuscates distinctions on which critical reasoning, effective 
 








communication, and policy creation depend”.162 Therefore, this research rectifies that problem 
by reducing obfuscation and wrongful synonymous association. This research clearly finds 
that dissuasion must be considered as its own respective tactic; not simply another form of 
deterrence. 
Dissuasion, according to this research, “refers not to what is to be achieved but to how – 
the means that are employed to get there”.163 The means which constitute dissuasion as a tactic 
are guiding another state toward action out of its own volition,164 utilizing strategy and actions to 
influence the nature of military competition, and channeling threats in certain directions to 
complicate planning for adversaries.165 Additionally, this research finds dissuasion is 
differentiated from deterrence because dissuasion can be used by any nation state regardless of 
hard power capabilities, and is diplomatic in nature without necessarily being a traditional form 
of diplomacy. 
 This research provides an understanding of dissuasion at a greater depth by boiling 
down the understanding of deterrence to the mere act of threat-of-punishment through 
militaristic or economic terror. Therefore, when deterrence is simplified, dissuasion is able to 
adequately be considered by the comprising components laid out in the aforementioned 
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paragraphs. Understanding that deterrence has been stretched beyond its threat-of-punishment 
meaning allows for dissuasion to fill the “hole” in policy planning, and close the gap in 
knowledge which was created in the transition from the QDR to the NDS. Filling the “hole” in 
policy planning will lead to more comprehensive policy creation through the proper 
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